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The Evolution Toward Judicial
Independence in the Continuing
Quest for LGBT Equality
Susan J. Becker†
Abstract
Judicial decisions that hold same-sex marriage bans
unconstitutional, no matter how that conclusion is reached, overturn
laws or constitutional provisions that were passed with the support of
a democratic majority. This Article takes an in-depth look at judicial
activism and judicial independence to determine whether such
victories for same-sex litigants were done properly by the judiciary. In
the eyes of the Framers, an independent judiciary was to be a crucial
check on the other branches’ constitutional limitations. With this in
mind, judicial independence—where, in contrast with activism, judges
meticulously apply the well-examined facts to controlling precedent
without accounting for majority views—is a key to maintaining our
democratic system.
This Article examines many of the cases that resulted in victories
for LGBT litigants. First, cases ruling state same-sex marriage bans
unconstitutional, for example, Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin and Iowa’s
Varnum v. O’Brien, are analyzed. Also, the cases declaring the federal
Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional, including Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, and the district court, circuit court, and
Supreme Court decisions in Windsor, are discussed. Although these
cases tend to overturn laws supported by democratic majorities, the
courts pay great attention to the details of the cases and steadfastly
analyze and apply precedent.
After looking in detail at cases establishing same-sex marriage
rights, one must conclude that the courts engaged in strong judicial
independence. Such independent judicial decision making contains
sound legal analysis and is constitutionally necessary.

†

Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University.
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Introduction
Many years have passed since Professor Rhonda Rivera published
her groundbreaking research on the disadvantaged legal status of gay
and lesbian citizens in this country. Titled Our Straight-Laced Judges:
The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,1
1.

Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L.J. 799 (1979)
[hereinafter Rivera I]. This article is reprinted in full at 50 Hastings
L.J. 1015 (1999); see also Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced
Judges: Twenty Years Later, 50 Hastings L.J. 1179 (1999) [hereinafter
Rivera II] (explaining the lack of legal literature in the 1970s on how the
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Rivera’s 157-page tome documented the dearth of legal protections
and abundance of judicial prejudice evident in cases where the sexual
orientation of one or more litigants was at issue.2 Her exhaustive
analysis of judicial decisions resolving controversies in private and
public employment, military service, professional licensing, public
school teaching, family law, First Amendment free speech and
association, immigration and naturalization, criminal law, and other
issues amply supported the conclusion Rivera foreshadowed in the
title of her article. “[J]udges in particular, as well as attorneys, need
to examine their homophobic attitudes and the many popularly held
myths and stereotypes,”3 Rivera wrote. “Only after such a
reevaluation of judicial and societal attitudes can our legal system
begin to achieve a fair and equal application of the laws to
all persons.”4
The majority of relatively recent court decisions—including the
U.S. Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decisions in Romer v. Evans,5
Lawrence v. Texas,6 and United States v. Windsor7—suggest that
many judges have begun engaging in the reflection Rivera had hoped
for, embracing a more neutral stance on homosexuality and devoting
more attention to the facts and law of the cases before them that
involve lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) litigants.8
law affected LGBT people and the efforts that went into producing the
first major article on the subject and outlining the advances and
setbacks LGBT litigants had experienced in the intervening twenty
years).
2.

Rivera I, supra note 1; see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551 (1993)
(providing a legal history of litigation involving LGBT litigants with
primary focus on cases decided prior to 1986); Mary C. Dunlap, The
Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female
Dichotomy, 30 Hastings L.J. 1131, 1139–47 (1979) (documenting legal
struggles faced by transgender and intersex individuals).

3.

Rivera I, supra note 1, at 1168.

4.

Id.

5.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

6.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

7.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

8.

See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity:
Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (2010) (providing
analyses of recent landmark decisions affecting LGBT rights and
suggesting that state and federal court judges are moving toward a
humanity-centered vision that recognizes LGBT people as worthy of
constitutional rights and protections); Susan J. Becker, Many Are
Chilled, but Few Are Frozen: How Transformative Learning in Popular
Culture, Christianity, and Science Will Lead to the Eventual Demise of
Legally Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the
United States, 14 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 177 (2006)
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This Article posits that court decisions extending equal rights to
LGBT litigants are not, as some critics claim, the result of improperly
motivated “judicial activism” or “culture wars” being waged
inappropriately in courts of law. To the contrary, pro-equality
decisions reflect the trend toward eradication of improper judicial bias
that historically animated judicial decisions in cases involving LGBT
litigants. In contrast to Justice Antonin Scalia’s view that judicial
decisions in which LGBT litigants prevail capitulate to the
“homosexual agenda,”9 this article explains that decisions advancing
LGBT equality are based on an appropriately restrained application
of law to facts, thus moving the judiciary closer to the elusive ideal of
judicial independence.
Arguments supporting this thesis are presented as follows. Part I
of this Article contrasts the abstract principle of judicial independence
as a cornerstone of U.S. democracy with the practical realities of
judicial decision making. Part II highlights the historical lack of
independence exercised by judges that resulted in unjust decisions and
perpetuated negative stereotypes of LGBT persons. Part III explores
the more recent trend of judges moving away from anti-LGBT animus
towards neutrality and independence in cases involving LGBT
litigants. Part III also examines the reasons for the lessening of antiLGBT judicial bias, focusing specifically on the compelling facts and
evidence presented in state and federal marriage equality cases,
including the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision.

I. Judicial Independence Overview
Only an independent judiciary can ensure that the minority is
protected from the tyranny of the majority. Only an independent
judiciary committed to the rule of law can safeguard every
citizen’s liberties and rights.10
A.

The Theoretical Ideal

Judicial independence demands that judges resolve cases with
fidelity to the “rule of law” established in case precedents, statutes,
and procedural rules.11 Decisions rendered in adherence to this
(tracking changes in societal and judicial attitudes toward LGBT people
over the past several decades and predicting that full equality will
eventually be gained in this country).
9.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

10.

Marsha K. Ternus, Judicial Independence in Peril?, 60 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 479, 487 (2012).

11.

See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United
States, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996) (emphasizing that judicial
independence requires judges to “decide according to law, rather than
according to their own whims or to the will of the political branches of
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principle are immunized from improper influences such as personal
interests, religious beliefs, concern for popular opinion, and the desire
to please special interest groups.12 As one judicial observer explains,
“[i]ndependent and impartial adjudication denies the notion that the
judge will bring to bear a view which represents that of a particular
section of the community.”13
The principal architects of the U.S. Constitution identified an
independent judiciary as essential to the survival of the nascent
republic.14 James Madison observed that “[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”15
Alexander Hamilton urged that constitutional limitations imposed on
Congress—“for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no
ex post facto laws, and the like”16—could only be achieved through
“complete independence of the courts of justice.”17 Hamilton also
defended the Constitution’s lifetime appointment of federal judges as
“the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”18
In language relevant to the contemporary struggle for LGBT
equality, Hamilton recognized the crucial role of judicial independence
in protecting the rights of minorities:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the
government”); Ternus, supra note 10, at 480 (defining the rule of law as
“a process of governing by laws that are applied fairly and uniformly to
all persons”).
12.

Ternus, supra note 10, at 480 (stating that judicial independence
demands a “judiciary that is committed to the rule of law, independent
of—free of—outside influence, including personal bias or preference”).

13.

Anthony Mason, The Appointment and Removal of Judges, in Fragile
Bastion: Judicial Independence in The Nineties and Beyond 1, 4
(Helen Cunningham ed., 1997).

14.

Judicial autonomy was not a novel idea. Rather, “the political theory of
an independent judiciary is the culmination of the work of eight political
theorists writing over the span of 22 centuries, with each building on the
contributions of the others.” Scott Douglas Gerber, A Distinct
Judicial Power: The Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 1607–
1787, at 325 (2011).

15.

The Federalist No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Edward Meade
Earle ed., 1937).

16.

The Federalist No. 78, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Meade
Earle ed., 1937).

17.

Id.

18.

Id. at 503.
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influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community.19

Hamilton further cautioned that judges need “an uncommon portion
of fortitude” to faithfully guard the Constitution “where legislative
invasions of it ha[ve] been instigated by the major voice of the
community.”20 Hamilton’s perspective became a cornerstone of
constitutional jurisprudence.21
Several centuries after Hamilton’s plea, Ninth Circuit Judge J.
Clifford Wallace observed that “although the Constitution imposes no
absolute limits on popular decision making, constitutional protections
and structures do represent significant practical restraints on the
scope of majoritarian democracy.”22 Constitutional structure, Judge
Wallace explained, reflects the Framers’ intent for “the judicial
branch to have a special role in the protection of [individual] rights.”23
The majority of colonies and the first states adopted similar
governmental structures based on this rationale.24
Efforts to safeguard judicial independence are deeply embedded in
state and federal constitutions and statutes and the regulatory
schemes that govern judges, lawyers, and others who interact with the
judiciary. The effectiveness of these measures to ensure judicial
independence remains subject to debate.
19.

Id. at 508.

20.

The Federalist No. 78, supra note 16, at 509 (Alexander Hamilton).

21.

Hamilton’s prediction that lifetime tenure of federal judges was essential
to judicial independence has been vindicated by the fact that “no federal
judge has ever been removed by impeachment for rendering an
unpopular decision, although the media and politicians regularly level all
kinds of scornful epithets at judges.” Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on
Judging: At Home and Abroad, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 219, 231 (2004).

22.

J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return
to the Moorings, in Judges on Judging: Views from the Bench 205,
206 (David M. O’Brien, ed., 4th ed. 2013).

23.

Id.

24.

See generally GERBER, supra note 14 (explaining the concept of
separation of powers from Aristotle through the drafting of the U.S.
Constitution with focus on the origins of an independent judiciary in the
original thirteen states and their colonial predecessors). Others have
observed that although judicial independence is commonly evaluated
through the lens of constitutional law decisions, it is also of great value
in disputes that demand neutral evaluation and application of various
legal authorities other than constitutional law and doctrine. Id. at 334
n.35.

868

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence

For example, the President’s power to appoint federal judges is
severely constrained by the requirement that nominees are elevated to
the federal bench only upon the “[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the
Senate.”25 This significantly limits the President’s power to appoint
justices based solely on the President’s personal-political litmus test.26
State judges face retention or contested elections, thus making them
accountable to the people for decisions that appear to unfairly favor
particular positions or parties.27
Judicial ethics codes further circumscribe the conduct of judicial
candidates and judges.28 For example, the premier rule in the
25.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Kevin L. Lyles, The Gatekeepers:
Federal District Courts in the Political Process 187 (1997)
(“Senate majority leader Trent Lott warned Clinton that the GOP
majority would ‘resist with every fiber of [its] being’ if Clinton ‘name[d]
the kind of federal judges who would overturn this week’s election
results with next year’s court decisions.’”); Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A.
Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments 85–116 (2005) (describing the process for nominating
Supreme Court justices, including the role of politics and ideology in
that process); Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians,
Activists, and the Lower Federal Court Appointment Process
(2005) (describing how congressional representatives support judicial
candidates who support their policies).

26.

Of course this safeguard is severely tested if not eliminated when: (1)
the President and a majority of Senators share the same political
ideology; and (2) the President and a sufficient number of Senators have
severely conflicting ideologies that prevent the President’s nominees
from being confirmed. The latter situation has been a defining
characteristic of President Obama’s time in office. See generally Sheldon
Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama’s Judiciary at
Midterm: The Confirmation Drama Continues, 94 Judicature 262
(2011) (containing extensive analysis of presidential judicial
appointments in historical context).

27.

Controversy continues as to whether merit selection of judges followed
by a retention election or contested judicial elections provide the
superior method of achieving a well-qualified, independent judiciary. See
Symposium, Judicial Elections, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (providing a
number of informative articles on issues relating to judicial elections in
the states); Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit Selection, 32
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 67 (2009) (advocating for merit selection
systems); Wald, supra note 21, at 223–24 (observing that
“[i]ndependence-oriented critics deplore the pressures imposed by direct
election of the high court judges in a majority of states, and democracyoriented critics are constantly reminding us of the unaccountability of
life-tenured federal judges who they say are too often free to follow their
own preferences rather than ‘the law’ or the public’s will”).

28.

Each state has its own system of regulating its judicial officers and
employees, and many have adopted the ABA Model Rules of Judicial
Conduct or modified versions thereof. Federal judges must follow the
regulations articulated in the Guide to Judiciary Policy, including the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which was substantially

869

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence

American Bar Association’s (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that judges “shall uphold and promote the independence,
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” avoiding not only
impropriety but “the appearance of impropriety.”29 Judges must also
avoid making decisions based on personal bias or prejudice30 and
“shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.”31 In short,
the ethics rules are part of a larger regulatory scheme that reflects “a
central core of agreed standards” that define judges “as the neutral,
impartial, calm, noncontentious umpire standing between the
adversary parties.”32
Respect for the theory of judicial independence is not, of course, a
uniquely American phenomenon. The advantage—indeed the
necessity—of judges unconstrained by personal bias, political pressure,
and other coercive forces has long been recognized elsewhere. This is
especially clear in international human rights.33 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, declares that
“[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals,” and that
once charged with a crime, “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”34 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
similarly champions the idea that “[e]veryone is entitled in full
revised in 2009 and partially revised in 2014. Guide to Judiciary
Policy: Code of Conduct for United States Judges (2014),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/condu
ct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf.
29.

Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 (2011). It is notable that
the Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
(2009) contain similar language.

30.

Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.3 (2011); Code of
Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3 (2009).

31.

Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.4 (2011); see also Code of
Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3(A)(1)(2009)
(containing similar language).

32.

Marvin E. Frankel, The Adversary Judge: The Experience of the Trial
Judge, in Judges on Judging, supra note 22, at 79, 80.

33.

See generally Harold Baer, Jr., Judges Under Fire: Human
Rights, Independent Judges, and the Rule of Law (2011)
(providing inspiring stories of judges who have refused to succumb to
political pressure and other outside influences, often at great personal
cost); Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights
Protection Around the World, 85 Judicature 195 (2002).

34.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, § 1, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 176. This document is now joined by over
160 nations. U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force 409 (2013)
(listing nations that are parties to the treaty); see also Wald, supra note
21, at 227–29 (emphasizing the importance of independent judges on
international courts).

870

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence

equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.”35
B.
1.

Theory Meets Reality

The Formalism-Realism Divide

Legal commentators have produced thousands of books and
articles attempting to explain how judges decide cases.36
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, judicial decisions were
rarely seen as illegitimate exercises of power. Based on the oracular
theory of judicial decision making, judges simply divined established
truths from a sufficient body of predominately common law. Viewed
through this somewhat esoteric lens, the “law was conceived as a
mystical body of permanent truths, and the judge was seen as one
who declared what these truths were and made them intelligible—as
an ‘oracle’ who found and interpreted the law.”37 The oracle theory
presupposed that court decisions were unaffected by the personal
values or judgments of the jurists rendering them.38
The concept that came to be known as “formalism” similarly
characterized the judicial decision-making process as so sterile and
cerebral that the possibility of personal bias was inconceivable. Often
associated with the judges who populated the U.S. legal system
between the 1870s and the 1930s, formalism characterizes
adjudication as a mechanical application of facts to law, yielding
consistent and just results.39 Formalism reflects the philosophy of
35.

UNITED NATIONS, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10
(1948).

36.

See generally The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (Nancy Maveety
ed., 2003) (discussing the diverse approaches taken by political scientists
beginning in the late nineteenth century in trying to devise and apply
scientific paradigms for analyzing how judges decide cases); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97
Cornell L. Rev. 191 (2012) (providing overview of theories of judicial
decision making and empirical studies of that process).

37.

G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles
of Leading American Judges 10 (3d ed. 2007).

38.

Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the
Federal Appellate Bench 206 (1980).

39.

Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 62 (1977). Formalists
perceived law as “a closed, logical system” in which “[t]he judicial
function has nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of law to
changing conditions; it is restricted to the discovery of what the true
rules of law are and indeed always have been.” Id. Moreover, “the truth,
once arrived at, is immutable and eternal.” Id.; see also Jerome
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) (describing formalist
American thought). Formalist thought took root during the Civil War
era and continued into the 1920s. See generally Gilmore, supra note 39,
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Christopher Columbus Langdell, the influential dean of Harvard Law
School who perceived law as a hard science akin to biology
or chemistry.40
In the scientific realm, problems yield one correct answer. Applied
in the legal realm, judges honored the doctrine of stare decisis41 by
carefully reviewing case precedents to find that single, correct answer.
This practice, in turn, left “no need or room for a judge’s values or
sense of the evolution of society.”42 Formalism’s roots, however, can
be traced back to the birth of the United States as an independent
nation, as colonists’ intense distaste for the vast discretion exercised
by royal judges fanned the flames of dissent.43 During “the Revolution
in 1776 Americans sought to severely limit this judicial discretion,”
one historian argues.44 “The aim, as [Thomas] Jefferson put it, was to
end ‘the eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing man’
and to make the judge ‘a mere machine.’”45 More recently, formalism
has been described as “the existence of an impermeable barrier
between the domain of legal argument, on the one hand, and that of
political or philosophical argument, on the other.”46
In contrast to the oracle or formalism views, Judge Jerome Frank
and others led the legal realism movement commonly associated with
the 1930s to present.47 Legal realists reject the conceptualization of
at 12; Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale
L.J. 493, 495 (1996) (noting that the formalistic perspective was greatly
influenced by Christopher Columbus Langdell’s advocacy of law as a
discrete “intellectual discipline independent of theology, moral
philosophy, economics, or political science, one that involved the
application of scientific methods to common law materials”).
40.

Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of
Ideas and Men, 1817–1967, at 175–76 (1967); Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1983).

41.

“[S]tare decisis refers to the practice of a court deferring to some set of
precedent for an institutional reason (in contrast to considering an issue
afresh).” Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the
United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787, 789–90 (2012).

42.

Coffin, supra note 38, at 207.

43.

Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 49, 50 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).

44.

Id.

45.

Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson, To Edmund Pendleton in 1 The Papers
of Thomas Jefferson 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).

46.

Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the
Legal Profession 252 (1993).

47.

See Roy Kreitner, Biographing Realist Jurisprudence, 35 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 765, 770–71 (2010). The growth of realism’s popularity did not
result in complete abandonment of formalism’s appeal. See, e.g., Herbert
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judges as processors applying law to fact in a mechanized manner.
Judge Frank, for example, observed that judicial decision making
departed from the scientific process employed for geometry in at least
two key ways. “First . . . the decisions of a judge inevitably draw
upon his experience in a way that the judgments of a geometer do
not,” notes one scholar.48 “And second, they are always the result of a
series of discretionary choices that have no counterpart in the science
of geometry.”49 As a result, Frank believed that “experience and
choice are not merely compatible with the activity of judging; they
are among its essential conditions.”50
Some realists conceptualize judicial decision making as judges
reaching conclusions first, and then embarking on quests to identify
facts and law supporting their desired outcomes, thereby undermining
both predictability and credibility.51 Adherents of this genre of realism
“debunked rules, principles, and the aspiration for certainty as mere
myths cloaking the willfulness inherent in judicial decisions.”52
This does not mean, however, that all judges, scholars, and others
gathered under the “realist” umbrella viewed judicial decision making
as a fraudulent process. As one scholar explained, many “realists
pointed to the role of idiosyncrasy in law, but they believed in a rule
of law—hence they attempted to make it more efficient and more
certain.”53 Far from being diehard cynics, realists hoped their
observations about the judicial process would serve “to increase the
certainty and predictability of law, to better train lawyers, to advance
legal justice, and to reform the law to better serve social needs.”54 A
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 15 (1959) (arguing that courts should apply constitutional
principles from an abstract perspective rather than the more personal
effect of those principles on the litigants, urging that “the main
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate
result that is achieved”).
48.

Kronman, supra note 46, at 189.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

See Frank, supra note 39, at 100; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 444 (1930).

52.

Coffin, supra note 38, at 209; see also White, supra note 37, at 204
(describing twentieth-century judges’ fall in status from oracle to “a
social engineer, or a ‘hunch player’ who understood and trusted his
instincts, or a craftsman in the ‘reasoned elaboration’ of justifications for
his power”).

53.

Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, at 231 (1986).

54.

Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The
Role of Politics in Judging 94 (2010).
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perspective described as “prudential realism” embraced the view that
“practical wisdom is needed in the study and administration of law.”55
2.

Empirical Data on Judicial Decision Making

Many modern theorists rely on empirical studies to cast judicial
decision making in more black-and-white terms: judges render
decisions based on their political ideologies and to advance their
personal and professional agendas and careers. These outcomeoriented models of judicial decision making are based primarily on
studies of federal appellate judges and Supreme Court justices. Extant
data lends significant support for both the attitudinal model, in which
judges decide cases based on political ideology,56 and strategic models
of judicial decision making.57
Like all empirical studies designed to link cause and effect,
empirical studies that identify factors influencing judicial decision
making are subject to criticism due to potential methodological flaws
and other shortcomings.58 In addition, empiricists readily admit that
55.

Kronman, supra note 46, at 168, 196 (crediting Columbia Law
Professor Karl Llewellyn with identifying prudential pragmatism, but
Llewellyn did not describe the judicial decision-making process in those
specific words). Id. at 225 (stating that Llewellyn “championed” and
“provided the richest account” of prudential realism).

56.

Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and
the Attitudinal Model Revisited 86 (2002).

57.

Strategic decision making can be defined in different ways. For example,
it includes cases in which appellate judges concur in a majority opinion
that at least guarantees their second-favored outcomes, thereby avoiding
their lesser (and perhaps least) favored resolution of the case. For a
discussion of how this type of strategic decision making can play out, see
Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through
the Lens of Political Science, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1131 (2014). It
can also mean that “justices [become] far-sighted individuals who are
wary of their counterpart players in American policy making,” and thus
craft their decisions with an eye toward actions the legislative and
executive branches may take in response to those decisions. Mario
Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Decision Making: The
Congressional Constraint, 28 Legis. Stud. Q. 247, 249 (2003).

58.

See, e.g., C. K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and
Judgment in Federal District Courts 136–51 (1996) (identifying
shortcomings and biases inherent in the behavioral paradigm
traditionally used to evaluate judicial behavior and suggesting that a
revised model should take into consideration factors including the factfinding process trial judges use to reach a decision in each case); Harry
T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That
Attempt to Understand The Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking,
58 Duke L.J. 1895, 1905 (2009) (positing that despite “recent
improvements in empirical studies, significant challenges remain”);
Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and
How Should We Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 135
(2009) (observing that “skepticism of the empirical literature on judicial
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“[f]requently the law is clear, and the judges should and will simply
implement it,” regardless of the judges’ jurisprudential, political, or
personal leanings.59
Regardless of whether the “science” of discerning judicial bias
remains grounded in its own preconceived bias about the influence of
politics on the courts and regardless of whether methodological errors
or other limitations affect empiricist conclusions, the theory of judicial
predictability based on the judges’ political attitudes has gained wide
acceptance. Contemporary news media frequently focus on the
political ideology, gender, or other factors unique to the judge or
judges rendering a newsworthy decision.60 News media also commonly
identify the President who appointed the lower court judge rendering
a decision in high-profile and controversial cases.61 No further
explanation is offered in these news reports, nor is one necessary,
regarding the relationship between the decision rendered and the
assumed judicial ideology that purportedly preordained—or that
ideology cannot be wholly dismissed as the product of ignorance or selfinterest on the part of the audience”); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to
Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235 (1999) (questioning the
assumptions empiricists make about how judges decide cases).
59.

Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 5 (2006); see also Virginia A.
Hettinger et al., Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on
Federal Appellate Decision Making 34 (2006) (explaining that “a
significant proportion” of cases reviewed by federal court of appeals
judges “do not raise issues that are matters of first impression or [are]
otherwise legally consequential,” and therefore “do not raise questions
sufficiently salient to elicit much reaction from the judges deciding
them”).

60.

See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, Gender and Judging, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1381,
1384–86 (2011) (describing media and public fixation on the gender split
among Wisconsin Supreme Court justices in a case challenging the
constitutionality of a lower court decision ordering a father of nine
children not to have more children as a condition of his probation
following his guilty plea on three felony counts of intentional nonsupport
of existing children).

61.

See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Editorial, A Victory for Self-Defense: In the
D.C. Gun Law Case, a Chance to Affirm the Second Amendment,
Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 2007, at A13 (opining on a recent D.C. Circuit
decision that struck down the District of Columbia’s gun control laws
and mentioning that “Senior Judge Laurence H. Silberman wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Judge Thomas B. Griffith, a recent Bush
appointee”); Ian Millhiser, Reagan-Appointed Appeals Court Judge
Rejects Religious Employer’s Attack on Birth Control Rules,
ThinkProgress (July 29, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
justice/2013/07/29/2373021/reagan-appointed-appeals-court-judge-reject
s-religious-employers-attack-on-birth-control-rules/# (commenting that
“George W. Bush appointee Kent Jordan dissented from the panel’s
decision”).
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contradicts—the decision rendered. The public has accepted a
correlation between politics and judicial decision making.62 The
public’s view is arguably confirmed by the great weight of empirical
studies on judicial decision making in general and decision making
involving LGBT litigants in particular.
a.

General Empirical Analyses

Empiricists have toiled for years to isolate and quantify the
factors that influence judges, seeking to identify a statistically
significant link between jurists’ perceived ideologies and demographic
traits and those jurists’ opinions.63 For more than seven decades,
political scientists and other researchers have employed quantitative
and qualitative methodologies to explain how judges resolve cases,
often focusing on the attitudinal characteristics assigned to U.S.
Supreme Court justices.64 Judge Richard Posner, for example,
identified nine theories which purport to explain judicial behavior, all
of which he considers “overstated or incomplete.”65
62.

In a national public opinion poll sponsored by the New York Times and
CBS News that was conducted from May 31 to June 3, 2012, for
example, seventy-six percent of respondents believed that the U.S.
Supreme Court decides cases based on the individual justices’ personal
and political views, while only thirteen percent of respondents thought
the decisions were rendered based on “legal analysis.” CBS News/New
York Times Poll: May 31–June 3, 2012, CBS News (June 7, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/CBSNYTPoll_health_care_0607
12.pdf.

63.

See generally The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, supra note 36.

64.

See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett, Courts,
Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process
(1961); Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes
and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963, at 6–7
(1965) (discussing early research on judicial decision making);
Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited: Psychometric
Analysis of Supreme Court Ideology (1974) (updating and refining
Schubert’s earlier work by employing psychological theory to construct
an empirical inventory of decisions that define the political ideologies of
individual Supreme Court justices focusing primarily on the 1953–1969
period in which Earl Warren served as chief justice and confirming
correlations between ideology and voting record); C. Herman Pritchett,
Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–
1941, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890 (1941) (presenting pioneering work in
the area of empirical analysis of judicial decision making); Martin
Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294 (1964) (discussing
political influences on judicial decision making).

65.

Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 19 (2008) (identifying the
nine theories as “the attitudinal, the strategic, the sociological, the
psychological, the economic, the organizational, the pragmatic, the
phenomenological and . . . the legalist”). Posner’s use of the term
“legalist” might be called “formalist” by other commentators. Id. at 7.
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The self-labeling of this discipline as “political jurisprudence” and
“judicial politics” signaled the researchers’ preconception that judges
are political animals who are, in whole or in part, incapable or
unwilling to fulfill the roles of independent actors.66 It is perhaps not
surprising, then, that the empiricists within this discipline have found
strong correlations between judicial ideology and decision making,
focusing intensively on the liberal-conservative divides among U.S.
Supreme Court justices.67 This attitudinal paradigm of judicial
decision making is explained by two of its advocates as follows:
This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in
light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes
and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way
he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted
the way he did because he was extremely liberal.68

Some empiricists offer more nuanced conclusions on the correlation
between ideology and judicial decisions. Professor Frank Cross, for
example, conducted extensive empirical review of 18,000 federal
appellate decisions. Due to the sheer volume of cases heard by the
circuit courts compared to the Supreme Court, Cross posits that these
66.

See Tamanaha, supra note 54, at 111–55 (discussing political
jurisprudence and potential preconceptions of the researchers); Nancy
Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political
Science, in The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, supra note 36, at 1,
31 (explaining the development of political science as a discipline and
the evolution of the study of judicial behavior, which at times was
“overshadowed by vehement methodological struggles and attendant
theoretical battles”).

67.

See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study
in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947, at 6–9 (1948)
(indicating that President Roosevelt responded to a series of 4–5
Supreme Court decisions “preclud[ing] legislative intervention in
economic and social affairs” by an unsuccessful attempt to increase the
number of judges on the Supreme Court); Sunstein et al., supra note
59, at 147 (reporting the finding of “striking evidence of a relationship
between the political party of the appointing president and judicial
voting patterns”). But see Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does
Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369 (2008)
(demonstrating the effect of legal factors that influence justices’
decisions).

68.

Segal & Spaeth, supra note 56, at 86; see also Corey Rayburn Yung,
Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and Independence
in the Federal Courts, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 505 (2012) (arguing
that judges’ political ideology is over-weighted in most empirical studies
of judicial decision making and employing additional regression analysis
metrics of “partisanship” and “independence” to provide more finely
tuned analysis).
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intermediate appellate courts “play by far the greatest legal policymaking role in the U.S. legal system.”69
Cross concluded that “judicial decision making clearly involves a
mix that includes some ideological influence, considerable legal
influence, and undoubtedly other factors.” 70 Cross observed that while
ideology, life experiences, gender, economic status, religion, and other
factors may influence judges to a degree,71 legal rules “matter greatly”
in case outcomes.72 This proved especially true when courts applied
rules and doctrines to threshold, and often determinative, matters of
“jurisdiction, standing, mootness, exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and the political question doctrine.”73
Additional research on federal circuit courts suggests that that
judges tend to follow rule of law unless applicable law is unsettled,74
and only cases with unclear precedent reveal trends based on political
ideology and other factors.75 Other data analyses found that federal
circuit courts are appropriately deferential to district court decisions
based on the applicable standard of review, another indicator
undermining the ideology-outcome correlation.76 However, other
studies conclude that the liberal-conservative attitudinal view of
judges serving on three-judge appellate panels predicts voting patterns
more strongly in some types of cases than in others, including cases
involving the rights of LGBT litigants.77
By studying the opinions issued by three-judge appellate panels,
researchers further identified decision-making influences grounded in
69.

Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals 2 (2007).

70.

Id. at 177.

71.

Id. at 75–89.

72.

Id. at 67.

73.

Id. at 179.

74.

See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 5 (observing that when
the applicable law is clear judges “will simply implement it,” regardless
of their ideology).

75.

Id. at 17–45.

76.

Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 20–21
(2011) (providing an empirical analysis of circuit court decisions that
reveals a strong correlation between the level of deference required by a
standard of review and the rate of appellate reversal).

77.

See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 20–21 tbl.2-1 (illustrating
that examining voting patterns of judges appointed by Democrat and
Republican presidents on twenty-three topics vary greatly on matters
involving gay and lesbian rights, affirmative action, and capital
punishment, but those voting patterns are much closer on criminal
appeals, takings cases, and punitive damages).
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institutional structure rather than the attitudinal views of the
judges.78 One team of researchers labeled this phenomenon as
“ideological dampening” and “ideological amplification.”79 Dampening
occurs when, for example, a Republican judge with a conservative
ideology sits with two Democratic judges with a more liberal
perspective on the law.80 The conservative judge is more likely to vote
with the liberal colleagues in that circumstance. Data confirms that
“Republican appointees look rather like Democratic appointees when
they sit with only Democratic appointees, and Democratic appointees,
in the presence of Republican appointees, turn out to look like
Republican appointees.”81 Amplification occurs when all three judges
share the same ideology, thereby reinforcing their tendency to vote in
a stereotypical fashion.82
Other institutional factors empiricists identify include appellate
judges’ status and tenure on the court (for example, temporary
appointment, new judge, seasoned jurist, or chief judge) and previous
judicial experience as influencing judicial opinions.83 Norms unique to
a particular appellate court—for example the tendency not to dissent
and the size of the court—may also influence the decision-making
process.84 Empirical data has even linked judges’ eating and break
patterns with the degree of mercy shown in those decisions
throughout the day.85
Data on trial courts is, of course, critical to understanding the
extent of judicial bias in the United States. Due to the sheer number
of litigants who appear before trial courts and the relatively small
78.

See, e,g., Cross, supra note 69, at 148–77. Cross concludes that “panel
effects are enormously important in determining the judge’s vote and
the case outcome.” Id. at 176–77.

79.

Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 8–10.

80.

Id. at 8–9.

81.

Id. at 54.

82.

Id. at 9–10.

83.

Hettinger et al., supra note 59, at 33–34; see also Coffin, supra
note 38, at 197 (observing based on personal experience that “judges on
the same kind and level of court develop thought patterns peculiar to
that particular court” which may include certain “moral
judgments, . . . social policy, and sometimes even philosophical
convictions”).

84.

HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 59, at 34–35.

85.

Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6889 (2011) (concluding from extensive study
of judicial decisions in parole board hearings that “the likelihood of a
favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the work day or after
a food break than later in the sequence of cases” and explaining how
other factors that may influence the judges’ decisions).
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number of cases appealed, more “justice” is dispensed by trial level
courts than intermediate appellate and state and federal courts of last
resort.86 In addition, the “broad formulations and resulting ambiguity
that characterize most higher court rulings, especially those of the
Supreme Court,”87 vest considerable discretion in trial courts to
interpret and apply the law. This is especially true when procedural
rules have a significant, and even determinative, impact on the case.88
Although limited in scope, analysis of trial level court decisions
tends to confirm that “to an impressive degree the voting patterns of
district court judges do reflect the political values of their appointing
presidents.”89 An analysis of federal trial court decisions through 1996,
for example, demonstrated that 79.1% of decisions rendered by judges
appointed by Democratic President James Carter resulted in
extension of voting rights, while 38.8% of the decisions rendered by
Republican President Ronald Reagan appointees extended those
rights.90 Similarly, Carter appointees voted in favor of affirmative
action 87.5% of the time compared to 40% by Reagan appointees.91
On the perennially controversial topic of abortion, Carter
appointees voted pro-choice 76.4% of the time, while Reagan
appointees did so 46.1% of the time.92 Other studies have identified
geographical factors that tend to predict judicial voting patterns,
frequently focusing on the differences between judges north (more
liberal) and south (more conservative) of the Mason-Dixon line, and

86.

In 2012, for example, 271,572 cases were terminated by federal district
courts. Caseload Statistics 2013, USCourts.gov, tbl.C, http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C00Se
p12.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (reporting statistics for U.S. District
Courts’ “Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the
12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2011 and 2012”). Only 57,501
cases were appealed that year. Id. at tbl.B (reporting statistics for U.S.
Courts of Appeals’ “Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pending
During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2012 and 2013”).

87.

Lyles, supra note 25, at 3.

88.

Jack B. Weinstein, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76
Brook. L. Rev. 439, 448 (2011) (remarking that “the substantive
balance between parties—what benefits they can expect from
litigation—may be affected by applicable procedure, making it easier or
harder to prosecute or defend, or to delay or expedite, an action”).

89.

Robert A. Carp & C. K. Rowland, Policymaking and Politics
in the Federal District Courts 53 (1983); see also Rowland &
Carp, supra note 58, at 21 (updating and confirming their earlier
conclusion).

90.

Lyles, supra note 25, at 219 tbl.7.5.

91.

Id. at 215 tbl.7.3.

92.

Id. at 210 tbl.7.1.
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the contrast between judges in urban (more liberal) and rural (more
conservative) areas.93
b.

Empirical Analyses of Decisions Involving LGBT Litigants

Social scientist and attorney Daniel Pinello analyzed 468 state
and federal appellate court decisions rendered in the 1980s and 1990s
that involved LGBT litigants.94 He isolated factors that both sustain
and challenge the notion that the judges rendering these decisions
embraced judicial independence as a core value.
Pinello concluded that trial and intermediate appellate courts
respected precedent and applied it when available.95 Framed in
judicial independence terms, these courts adhered to the “rule of law”
if one existed. Pinello also observed that judges seemed to respect the
facts of each case when applying the law.96
Pinello’s conclusions contain a number of points affirming the
attitudinal model of judicial decision making. For example, female97
and racial minority98 judges produced many of the decisions favoring
LGBT litigants. Jewish judges rendered more decisions favorable to
LGBT litigants and Catholic judges rendered more unfavorable
decisions.99 Younger judges issued more pro-LGBT decisions than
their more seasoned counterparts.100 Political ideology also appeared
highly correlative to outcome, as judges appointed by Democratic
presidents were significantly more receptive to the equality claims of
LGBT litigants than Republican appointees.101
Other researchers studied twenty-two U.S. Circuit Court decisions
involving lesbian or gay litigants decided between 1980 and 2005.
They concluded that individual judges appointed by Democratic (and
thus arguably more liberal) presidents voted in favor of homosexual
litigants fifty-seven percent of the time.102 Their arguably more
conservative Republican counterparts did so in only sixteen percent of

93.

Rowland & Carp, supra note 58, at 58–86.

94.

Daniel R. Pinello, Gay Rights and American Law 76–93 (2003).

95.

Id. at 79, 82, 150.

96.

Id. at 79. It is not clear whether Pinello’s methodology specifically
screened for the possible judicial selectivity of facts or issue selection,
two common threats to judicial independence described above.

97.

Id. at 88.

98.

Id. at 87.

99.

Id. at 88–91.

100. Id. at 91.
101. Id. at 114–15, 151–52.
102. Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 20–21, 57 tbl.2-1.
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the cases.103 In addition, a three-judge Democratic panel was seven
times more likely to vote in favor of a lesbian or gay party than a
panel of three Republicans.104 These data represented the greatest gap
between liberal and conservative judges in all twenty-three categories
of cases examined, including highly controversial matters such as
affirmative action, abortion, and capital punishment. The researchers
observed:
Hence, we find extremely strong evidence of ideological voting—
the strongest evidence, in terms of raw percentages, of all our
case categories. Indeed, the party difference is so marked that it
is statistically significant even with this small sample of cases.
Perhaps this is unsurprising, because the issue of gay and
lesbian rights causes intense political conflict in general.105
3. Additional Theories of Judicial Decision Making

Existence of empirical data has not convinced all modern theorists
that the attitudinal or strategic models of judicial decision making are
sound. Judge Richard Posner, for example, rejects theories of legalism
(his term roughly analogous to formalism), extreme attitudinalism,
and other judicial decision-making theories in favor of casting judges
as pragmatists. While recognizing “that there is a pronounced
political element in the decisions of American judges,”106 Posner also
concludes that “constrained pragmatist” is the term “that best
describes the average American judge at all levels of our judicial
hierarchy and yields the greatest insights into his behavior.”107
According to Judge Posner, the pragmatic judge (1) considers the
consequences of his decision not only to the parties in the case but
also the broader institutional and societal consequences;108 (2) rejects
the unsupported claims of legal realists (formalists) that legislatures
are capable of regularly altering law to keep up with changing
times;109 (3) astutely identifies false claims that two equally valuable
competing interests are at stake;110 (4) searches for the discernible
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 57. Because the sample size was small, the researchers could not
determine whether amplification or dampening of political ideology
occurred due to the specific composition of the three-judge panels when,
for example, two Democrats sat with a Republican, or vice versa. Id.
106. Posner, supra note 65, at 369.
107. Id. at 231.
108. Id. at 238, 242–43.
109. Id. at 240.
110. Id. at 242–43.
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purpose of the rule being applied when the scope of application is
uncertain;111 (5) favors deciding cases on narrow rather than broad
grounds, especially “in the early stages of the evolution of a legal
doctrine”;112 and (6) recognizes that legal reasoning is not
distinguishable from “ordinary, everyday reasoning” that takes into
account the actual benefits and costs of a decision and moves beyond
the parties’ rhetoric to examine and rely upon the facts and data
presented in the case.113 While recognizing the validity of labeling the
U.S. Supreme Court as a political court, Judge Posner posits that the
justices are still pragmatists, as they often appear driven by the
political consequences of their decisions.114
After exploring much (but by no means all) of the vast literature
on the realism-formalism debate and other schools of thought, the
view articulated by Professor Brian Tamanaha proves particularly
compelling. Tamanaha writes that “the story about the legal
formalists is highly an invention, and legal realism is substantially
misapprehended.”115 Stated simply, most judicial decision making
occurs near the middle of a spectrum anchored at opposite ends by
realism and formalism. Judicial decisions are also greatly informed by
the unique facts and law of each case. Tamanaha employs the term
“balanced realism”116 to describe what is perhaps the most common
approach to judicial decision making, past and present. Tamanaha
concludes:
Judges are unique individuals with bents, biases, and various
strengths and limitations, as well as differences in moral and
political views, and differing views of judging (beyond a
common core). These aspects . . . combine to create a zone of
111. Id. at 245.
112. Id. at 246.
113. Id. at 248.
114. Id. at 269.
115. Tamanaha, supra note 54, at 3. Tamanaha deconstructs the history and
rationales that have long been associated with the formalist and realist
views of American law and makes a strong case for blurring the lines
that separate these allegedly disparate periods of U.S. legal history. He
rejects the claim “that judges in the ‘formalistic age’ reasoned in a
bizarrely mechanical manner unlike judges before or after them,” and
makes an equally compelling case that “[v]irtually every one of the core
insights about judging now associated with the realists was prominently
stated decades before, often by historical jurists.” Id. at 43, 79.
116. Id. at 8; see also Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins
(Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 213 (2009)
(explaining that both formalism and realism are entrenched in the legal
system, but “neither is adequate to describe the ways in which lawyers,
judges, or legal academics reason, interpret, or elaborate law”).
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uncertainty and variation in judicial decision making. It has
always been so. Nonetheless, legal rules frequently work and
judges frequently render rule-bound decisions.117
4.

In Their Own Words: How Judges Decide Cases

“Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer
wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially.”118
“If it were only that simple.”119
a.

Acknowledging the Obvious

Insightful explanations of how judges decide cases are found in
the words of the jurists themselves.120 A common judicial revelation is
that each jurist holds a worldview molded from his or her life
experiences and the shared perspectives of family, friends, colleagues,
and others with whom they interact. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes famously explained:
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”121

Benjamin Cardozo similarly acknowledged that every judge has an
underlying philosophy,122 and despite valiant efforts to see things
objectively, “we can never see them with any eyes except our own.”123
To the contrary, “[d]eep below consciousness are other forces, the likes
and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habit and convictions, which make the
man, whether he be litigant or judge.”124

117. Tamanaha, supra note 54, at 187.
118. Thomas G. Saylor, On the Nature of Judging: First Annual Jurist in
Residence Lecture, 20 Widener L.J. 681, 682 (2011) (quoting
Socrates).
119. Id. (presenting Judge Saylor’s reflection on Socrates’ observation).
120. See generally Judges on Judging, supra note 22 (containing speeches
and essays from historically significant and contemporary judges).
121. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
122. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 12
(1921).
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 167.
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Affirming the insights of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter, a contemporary state supreme court justice explained the
process this way:
[J]udging is a craft, not a science. In performing their work,
judges bring to bear their experience and practical knowledge,
honed by habit and informed by common understanding.
Although the precise manner in which they do this is difficult to
describe, the end of the endeavor is not. Judges, wrote Justice
Frankfurter, are called upon for “allegiance to nothing except
the [effort], amid tangled words, amid limited insights, . . . to
find their path through precedent, through policy, through
history, . . . to the best judgment that poor fallible creatures
can arrive at in that most difficult of all tasks, the [achievement
of justice] between man and man, between man and state,
through reason called law.”125

Judge Diane S. Sykes reframed these truisms succinctly: “it goes
without saying that judges do not shed their life experiences when
they put on the robe.”126
The candid reflections of the judges quoted above are confirmed
by empirical evidence. A survey of federal district court judges
revealed that 6.6% of respondents “often” and fifty-one percent
“sometimes” felt that their personal attitudes and values affected
their discretionary judgments.127 An even higher number—9.2%
“often” and 64.1% “sometimes”—felt that other judges’ decisions were
affected by those judges’ personal attitudes and values.128 As
explained in Part I.B.4.b, some judges reject the portraits painted by
this study, or at least call for a more nuanced understanding of the
many factors affecting the judicial decision-making process.
b.

Commitment to Neutrality: Personal and Institutional Restraints

While acknowledging that “moral values, ideas of social utility,
and philosophical insights occasionally play a significant role” in
judicial decision making, Judge Frank Coffin believed that “a case on
point or clearly analogous, analysis of the evidence . . . , a procedural
or jurisdictional requirement, a compelling public policy, a close

125. Saylor, supra note 118, at 696 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices
I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 905 (1953)).
126. Sykes, supra note 60, at 1388.
127. Lyles, supra note 25, at 21 tbls.2 & 3. The survey was conducted in
1992 and 1993 and over sixty percent of federal district judges
responded. Id. at 275.
128. Id. at 21 tbls.2 & 3.
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reading of legislative history, and considerations of institutional
appropriateness will in the end decide most cases.”129
Judge Sykes echoed Judge Coffin’s sentiment. “Of course judges
have life experiences and philosophical views that affect their
understanding of the cases they must decide, and some of these may
be linked to gender, race, or ethnicity,”130 Judge Sykes posits. “Good
judges will constantly check for these influences and deal with them
judiciously, consistent with the obligations of the judicial oath of
office.”131 She opines that judges accept their assigned role of
rendering decisions “based on factors external to themselves: the
legally salient facts of the case and the most faithful reading of the
constitution and laws, applicable precedent, and accepted principles of
legal interpretation.”132
Despite the challenges of confronting inherent and perhaps even
unconscious biases when deciding cases, the vast majority of judges
who have voiced an opinion on the judicial decision-making process
appear to agree with Judges Coffin and Sykes: judicial officers commit
to resolving each issue and case as neutrally as humanly possible.
Judges also recognize and respect various internal and external
constraints on their decision-making authority.
As Judge Cardozo explained, although judges “cannot transcend
the limitations of the ego and see anything as it actually is, . . . the
ideal is one to be striven for within the limits of our capacity.”133 And
limitations on exercises of judicial ego do exist, even in the ubiquitous
realm of judicial discretion. Cardozo explained:
The judge, even when he is free, is not wholly free . . . . He is
not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, [and] disciplined by system, and subordinated to “the
primordial necessity of order in the social life.”134

129. Coffin, supra note 38, at 196; see also id. at 199–203 (expanding on the
role of judges’ values and background in judicial decision making).
130. Sykes, supra note 60, at 1390.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1388.
133. Cardozo, supra note 122, at 106.
134. Id. at 141 (quoting 2 FRANCIOS GENY, METHODE D’INTERPRETATION ET
SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF § 200 (1899) (quoted to and
translated by Benjamin N. Cardozo)).
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Like Judge Cardozo, Judge Alex Kozinski readily acknowledges that
judges at every level possess considerable discretion, but he also
identifies three “very significant restraints” on the exercise of that
discretion.135
The first constraint is self-respect. “Judges have to look in the
mirror at least once a day, just like everyone else,” Judge Kozinski
explains. “[T]hey have to like what they see.”136 Judges who choose to
abandon principle to reach a result will have to do so by deliberate
choice, a choice that, by and large, judges tend not to make.137 The
second constraint is imposed by judicial colleagues. Trial judges face
review by three-judge appellate panels, and court of appeals judges
must persuade others to join their opinions.138 When a litigant seeks
en banc review, the writing judge’s “shortcuts, errors and oversights
are mercilessly paraded before the entire court.”139 Flawed opinions
also invite stinging dissents that highlight the writing judge’s
shortcomings.140 The final constraint “often overlooked but awesome
nonetheless” is the political reaction to decisions, either via legislation
invalidating the opinion or removal of judges from office.141
Judge Coffin identified the near-universal requirement that judges
render public, written decisions as another institutional constraint on
judicial decision making.142 When reciting the relevant facts,
applicable law, legal logic, and overriding policy supporting the
resolution of a case a judge may realize that the result “looks different
when dressed up in written words and sent out into the sunlight.”143
Judges may discover that what appeared to be sound reasoning
supporting a particular outcome is seriously flawed, and the opinion
“simply ‘won’t write.’”144
135. Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial
Decision Making, in Judges on Judging, supra note 22, at 115, 116.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 116–17; see also Coffin, supra note 38, at 58 (observing that
“almost everything an appellate judge is called upon to do he must do
with his colleagues”).
139. Kozinski, supra note 135, at 117.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Coffin, supra note 38, at 57; see also Saylor, supra note 118, at 681–82
(explaining “that in the area of constitutional interpretation . . . a court
makes difficult choices among competing values, and [then is] obliged by
tradition and compelled by institutional necessity, to supply reasons for
such choices”).
143. Coffin, supra note 38, at 57.
144. Id.
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Judge Coffin concluded that “[t]he act of writing tells us what
was wrong with the act of thinking.”145 An opinion is defendable only
if it “marshals facts and precedents, logic and analogy, and broad
policy implications of the decision in contemporary society so that the
result is seen as fair, expectable, and perhaps even inevitable.”146
Judge Jack B. Weinstein echoed Judge Coffin’s observations.
“Ultimately,” Judge Weinstein states, “it is the trial judge’s
conscience, exercised under the constraints of our rule of law, that
guides the pen writing an opinion justifying a judgment.”147
Judge Patricia Wald identified additional constraints on judicial
decision making, including “the formidable Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Evidence,” and “[p]ermanently
recorded and widely disseminated opinions [that] also make for
responsible judgments, as do the oral processes of court arguments
and the scrutiny of a regular and alert bar trained in the same legal
culture as the judges.”148 Judge Wald also characterized “[t]he press
and academic criticism” as additional and “powerful tools to make a
judge think hard about her rulings.”149
c.

Activism

“History has taught . . . that political parties support judicial
independence as long as their interests are the same, but as soon
as their interests diverge, they decry judges as activists
overreaching their power.”150

Claims of judicial activism have long been a subject of heated
political discourse,151 but in recent years have reached a fevered pitch.
Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor posits that “the
breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary
145. Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 88, at 453–54 (concluding that a
“candid statement of the reasoning supporting the trial court’s decision
is always required” and that “[m]endacity in twisting the facts, evidence,
history, or legal background to arrive at a conclusion is not
acceptable”).
146. Coffin, supra note 38, at 196.
147. Weinstein, supra note 88, at 454.
148. Wald, supra note 21, at 232.
149. Id. at 231.
150. Baer, supra note 33, at 77.
151. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977)
(criticizing the Supreme Court for continuously revising the
Constitution while claiming only to be interpreting it and arguing that
the Court should exercise restraint by employing an “original
internationalist” approach).
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may be unmatched in American history.”152 Professor Friedman
observed that the newest twist on judicial activism claims is that “for
the first time in American history, the Supreme Court’s power of
judicial review has come under siege simultaneously from both sides of
the ideological spectrum.”153
Similarly, the ability of political operatives to effectively harness
public unrest about the power of the judiciary has reached new
heights. The “judicial activism” mantra became the focal point for the
well-orchestrated, well-financed, and successful fall 2010 campaign to
oust three Iowa Supreme Court justices who, along with four of their
colleagues, had unanimously ruled that the state’s constitution
required marriage equality for same-sex couples.154 No other Iowa
Supreme Court justice, appellate judge, or district judge had lost a
retention bid since 1962 when Iowa adopted its current judicial
selection and retention system.155 Election experts offered assurance
that the rule of law was not endangered by the results of a single
election in Iowa,156 but they also tended to agree that “‘[w]hat
happened in Iowa cannot help but give a temporary chill to other
courts when faced with such a highly charged political issue as gay
marriage.’”157 Efforts to oust a fourth Iowa Supreme Court justice who
joined the court’s marriage equality decision proved unsuccessful.158
152. Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to Judicial Independence,
Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A18.
153. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion
Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of
the Constitution 7 (2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in
Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for
America (2005) (critiquing courts from a liberal perspective); Mark R.
Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroying
America (2005) (critiquing courts from a conservative view point).
154. Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges: Landmark Iowa Elections Send a
Tremor Through the Judicial Retention System, 95 A.B.A. J. 56 (2011);
Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster
of Three Justices, 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 715 (2011).
155. Curriden, supra note 154, at 56.
156. Id. at 56–57 (quoting a number of professors and judges including New
York University School of Law’s Professor Berry Friedman and the
Indiana Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Randall Shepard).
157. Id. at 56 (quoting Professor Friedman).
158. Beth Dalbey, Election 2012: Iowans Reverse Trend, Retain Supreme
Court Justice Who Ruled on Same-Sex Marriage, West Des Moines
Patch (Nov. 7, 2012, 6:31 AM), http://westdesmoines.patch.com/group
s/politics-and-elections/p/election-2012-judicial-retention-vote (reporting
that Judge David Wiggins received a fifty-four percent approval vote,
compared to approximately seventy-four percent approval vote garnered
by each of the three justices appointed to replace the justices voted out
of office in 2010 due to their marriage-equality decision).
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The heart of the judicial activism debate lies in the fact that
“[o]ver the course of two centuries, the Supreme Court has
successfully asserted that it and it alone has the final say on the
constitutionality of the elected branches of national government and
all branches of state government.”159 The highest courts of the various
states have similarly assumed the role of ultimate arbiters of laws
enacted by elected legislators and decisions made by elected members
of the executive branch. State and federal courts also routinely review
ballot initiatives for constitutional and procedural flaws, thus imbuing
the judiciary with powers superior to “the people” in whom the U.S.
and state constitutions purport to vest the greatest power.160
“Understandably, this strikes many people as a peculiar arrangement
for a nation that claims to be a democracy.”161 Advocates of “judicial
restraint” predict dire consequences, including the emasculation of
fundamental doctrines and undermining of separation of powers if
activism is left unchecked.162
1.

In Search of a Definition

Terms such as activist judges and judicial activism belie a single
definition. One widely accepted meaning is “deciding a case contrary
to the plain meaning of the Constitution [or other applicable law] in
order to promote the judge’s political preferences.”163 Some scholars
159. Frederick P. Lewis, The Context of Judicial Activism: The
Endurance of The Warren Court Legacy in a Conservative
Age 5 (1999). Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in which the Court declared
itself superior to the supposedly co-equal legislative and executive
branches of federal government on issues requiring constitutional
interpretation, is often cited as among the earliest and most enduring
examples of judicial activism. See, e.g., id. at 8. Sharply contrasting
views of the proper approach to judicial review are provided in the
classic works of John Hart Ely and Raoul Berger. Compare John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
103 (1980) (arguing that the Court functions legitimately when it strikes
down laws or practices that are designed to allow those in power to hold
onto that power by “choking off the channels of political change” or
when representatives of the majority disadvantage a minority out of
hostility or prejudice), with Berger, supra note 151 (advocating for
courts to rely more heavily on the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution and contending that the Supreme Court has rewritten in
the Constitution while claiming merely to be interpreting it).
160. See generally Lori J. Rankin, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights: Equal
Protection Challenges to the Right’s Campaign Against Lesbians and
Gay Men, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1055 (1994).
161. Lewis, supra note 159.
162. Wallace, supra note 22, at 214.
163. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making
Sense of Supreme Court Decisions 38 (2006).
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have used the concept “simply to characterize a Court willing to use
its authority to engage in judicial review in an assertive manner,”
with such assertiveness implying “a considerable degree of doctrinal
pronouncement that is innovative, at least in the sense that it has not
been explicitly pronounced before.”164 Others define activism by
identifying a number of outcomes that allegedly prove that activism
has occurred.165 Judicial activism has also been defined—and
defended—as “a form of creative constitutional development,”166 and
an inappropriate embrace of the concept of a “living” or “growing”
Constitution.167 On the other side, judicial activism has become “a
code word used to induce public disapproval of a court action that a
politician opposes, but is powerless to overturn.”168 Such incantations
affect the public “on an emotional level without provoking any
reasoned discourse among them.”169
2.

Flaws Inherent in Contemporary “Activism” Label

Multiple flaws pervade the ubiquitous use of the term “judicial
activism” to condemn the judicial decision-making process in general
and a specific judge’s controversial opinion in particular. Part I.C.2
focuses on just three of those flaws.
a.

Judges Must Judge

By definition, judges must exercise judgment and often do so in
situations where applicable law is ill defined or nonexistent. Judges
must apply both precise legal rules offering bright-line tests and
intentionally elastic equitable principles featuring vague balancing
tests.170 And regardless of the source of law at issue—legislative,
164. Lewis, supra note 159, at 7.
165. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial
Activism, 66 Judicature 236 (1983) (identifying six scenarios in which
activism occurs, including the alteration of earlier precedent,
interpretation of constitutional provisions in a manner contrary to the
clear intention of the drafters, and establishing policy rather than
leaving that role to other government agencies).
166. Lewis, supra note 159, at 89.
167. Wallace, supra note 22, at 212.
168. William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, in Judges
on Judging, supra note 22, at 42, 42; see also Coffin, supra note 38, at
200 (observing that a judge is often pigeonholed as a model of “judicial
restraint” or of “judicial activism,” even though the public’s
understanding of how judges actually decide cases “seems to have
originated in myth and to be perpetuated by convention”).
169. Justice, supra note 168.
170. See Weinstein, supra note 88, at 453 (acknowledging that a “trial court
is always concerned with the conflict between strict law and flexible
equity,” as “[a]nalytical purity in chambers favors the former; empathy
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constitutional, regulatory, or case precedent—the legal authorities
governing any given case are often inherently ambiguous and
legitimately capable of multiple interpretations. As former D.C.
Circuit Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald aptly observed, “Dealing in
words is a dangerous business . . . . Dealing in long, vague, fuzzymeaning words is even more dangerous business, and most of the
words The Law deals in are long and vague and fuzzy.”171
Justice Felix Frankfurter’s comments echo Judge Wald’s
sentiment. He characterized the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection as “vague and admonitory” and of
“dubious . . . appropriateness for judicial enforcement.”172 Judge
Learned Hard similarly admitted to not knowing “what the doctrine is
as to the scope” of the Due Process Clauses located in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.173 In Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s experience,
“[o]bscurity of statute or of precedent or of customs or morals, or
collision between some or all of them, may leave the law unsettled,
and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it retrospectively in the
exercise of a power frankly legislative in function.”174
More recently, the dilemma was framed in these terms:
“Frequently the law is clear, and judges should and will simply
implement it . . . . But what happens when the law is unclear? In
that event, it is hopelessly inadequate to ask judges to ‘follow the
law.’”175 Lack of clarity in the existence and application of law has
been a recurring issue in cases involving LGBT litigants due to the
relatively recent phenomenon of individuals willing to (or forced to)
acknowledge their minority sexual orientation status and identity.
Indeed, in LGBT rights and other cases, litigation is often
initiated because the respective legal rights and duties of the litigants
are unclear under existing law. But lack of settled law does not justify
a court’s decision to decline jurisdiction over a contentious and
politically charged matter. To the contrary, judges “simply are not in
a position to refuse to respond to proper cases instituted by

in the courtroom for individuals living in an imperfect world leans
toward the latter”).
171. Patricia M. Wald, Commencement Address, 32 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1982) (quoting FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 39 (Berkeley
ed., 1980)).
172. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 217, 229, 237 (1955). Lack of clarity extends beyond
constitutional law to statutory and regulatory law.
173. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights: The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures, 1958, at 55 (1960).
174. Cardozo, supra note 122, at 128.
175. Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 5.
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appropriate parties under provisions of statutory or constitutional
law.”176
Similarly, the facts of a case rarely present themselves in the tidy
and uncontroverted manner suggested by courts’ written disposition
of cases. A judge must often choose between sharply contrasting
versions of the events resulting in the litigation. At the trial level,
courts are intentionally vested with significant discretion to assess the
relative credibility of the competing versions of reality. Appellate
courts may revisit the trial court’s credibility decisions to determine
whether the factual findings are supported by the evidence, albeit
under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.
b.

Judges Must Constrain Legislators

Judges play a unique role in the checks and balances embedded in
the U.S. and state constitutions. Contrary to the popular argument
that judges who strike down legislation inflict severe injuries on a
democratic form of government, judges are not charged with
advancing or imposing the will of the majority.177 That role is assigned
to legislators and elected members of the executive branch.
As declared by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,178
the judicial branch is entrusted with the much more challenging task
of preventing the “tyranny of the majority” being imposed via
legislative enactments and other government action on minorities who
are entitled to enjoy the privileges and protections that the U.S.
176. Phillip J. Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District
Court Judges and State and Local Officials 328 (1988)
(reflecting on court intervention in matters of public housing,
desegregation, prison, and mental health placements).
177. See, e.g., Brian Tashman, Vander Plaats: Entire Iowa Supreme Court
Must Resign, RightWingWatch.org (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:08 PM),
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/vander-plaats-entire-iowa-supreme
-court-must-resign (explaining Bob Vander Plaats’s argument that judges
who disregard “the will of the people” harm democracy and should be
voted out of office). Vander Plaats chaired the “Iowa for Freedom”
movement that resulted in three Iowa justices losing their retention
elections due to the Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous decision that a
ban on same-sex marriage violated the Iowa Constitution. Id. National
groups advancing the same argument in Iowa included, among others,
The American Family Association, The National Organization for
Marriage, and The Family Research Council. See Patrick Caldwell,
Disorder in the Court, Am. Prospect, Oct. 2011, at 44, 48.
178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326 (1819)
(expounding upon Supreme Court’s power of review). The power of the
judiciary to review and invalidate the acts of legislatures and executives
has been controversial “[t]hroughout history” due to the “chief
complaint . . . that it interferes with the right of the people to govern
themselves.” Friedman, supra note 153, at 5.
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Constitution promises to all.179 Accordingly, “the judicial branch is
responsible for resolving disputes between citizens and their
government, including claims by citizens that the government has
violated their constitutional rights.”180 The courts will continue to
fulfill that critical role absent the Supreme Court’s reversal of
Marbury or the equally unlikely event of a Constitution amendment
stripping courts of the power to review legislative and executive
acts.181
Though often subject to criticism, Marbury’s holding is not
“undemocratic.” Looking back to the genesis of U.S. law deeply
embedded in the English system, it is obvious that the United States
never adopted the “one-man, one-vote on most of the crucial issues of
society’s survival.”182 Rather, the United States has “a rule of law
growing out of a nine-hundred-year Anglo-American tradition that
gives us a total process of institutional balance of which one-man,
one-vote is an integral part.”183 As a result, the form of “democracy”
employed in the United States “is really remarkable for its

179. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) (explaining that, although majorities
rule in democratic forms of government, there are nonetheless “areas
properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in
these aspects of life is tyranny”); see also Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 139
(1990) (describing the conflict inherent in the United States between
self-governance in which majorities rule and constitutional protections
for “areas of life in which the individual must be free of majority rule”).
Compared to federal courts in which judges are appointed for life, the
role of the judiciary in protecting citizens from the tyranny of the
majority is not quite as controversial in state systems because judges are
elected or subject to retention votes and thus ultimately answerable to
the electorate for their decisions.
180. Ternus, supra note 10, at 480; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed.,
Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2010, at WK9
(opining that “the judiciary, unlike the legislative and the executive
branches, is supposed to answer only to the law and the Constitution”
and is not accountable to campaign donors or ideological groups).
181. See United States v. Munoz-Florez, 495 U.S. 385, 396–97 (1990)
(observing that “the principle that the courts will strike down a law
when Congress has passed it in violation of such a [constitutional]
command has been well settled for almost two centuries”); see also
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1432 (2012) (citing Munoz-Flores
for the principle that courts have the power “to resolve the
constitutionality or propriety of the act of another branch of
Government”).
182. Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America 140 (1981).
183. Id.
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nondemocracy, that is, its protection of minorities, dissenters,
incompetents, misfits, and social outcasts.”184
c.

Judges Must Facilitate the Law’s Evolution

The principles of equality and various personal fundamental
freedoms are deeply embedded in the U.S. and state constitutions.
These promises and protections foster significant individual
autonomy, which in turn produces myriad fact patterns to which
established legal authorities must be applied. Over time, individual
and societal change necessitates the transformation of law itself.185
Surely the framers of the U.S. Constitution and the authors of the
Fourteenth Amendment could not imagine the concept of “equal
protection” being applied to women, much less to lesbians, gay men,
and transgender individuals. As Roscoe Pound explained, mechanical
application of the law results in its “petrifaction,” inappropriately
stifling “independent consideration of new problems and of new
phases of old problems.”186

II. Judicial Independence and LGBT Litigants
A.

Possible Degrees of Judicial Independence

It is impossible to calculate precisely the degree of judicial
independence in any judicial decision. Despite voluminous empirical
data on judicial decision making, only the judge who rendered the
decision knows what truly informed his or her decision in that
particular case. Even then, unconscious factors may have influenced
the process.187
184. Id. at 140–41; see also Coffin, supra note 38, at 215–21 (refuting the
argument that the judicial branch is “undemocratic”). Judge Richard
Posner takes this logic a step further, arguing that the prevailing
assumption that populist legislatures only act “with the consent of the
governed” is unrealistic. Richard A. Posner, What Am I, A Potted
Plant?: The Case Against Strict Constructionism, in Judges on
Judging, supra note 22, at 223, 225. To the contrary, Judge Posner
doubts that the legislative branch routinely reflects majority views when
it enacts legislation. Speaking from personal experience, Judge Posner
states that his preferred candidates sometimes fail to be elected, and
that the winning candidates for which he voted often enacted legislation
that he disfavors. And “[g]iven the effectiveness of interest groups in the
political process,” Judge Posner adds, “much of this legislation probably
didn’t have the consent of a majority of citizens.” Id.
185. See generally Posner, supra note 184, at 193.
186. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 606
(1908).
187. See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994)
(opining “that all judges, as a part of basic human functioning, bring to
each decision a package of personal biases and beliefs that may
unconsciously and unintentionally affect the decision making process”).
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Relative assessments of judicial independence can be attempted
by identifying the model of judicial decision making that the judge
appears to have embraced when rendering the decision (e.g.,
pragmatist, oracle, balanced realist, etc.). One can then attempt to
gauge how near or far that model is from the ideal of judicial
independence.
Determining the judicial decision-making model or models the
judge employed in a particular case is admittedly an inexact
exercise.188 Nonetheless, in many cases the judge’s attitude regarding
the dispute at hand, the state of the law, and the litigants is revealed
in the language of the decision, the judge’s framing (or re-framing) of
factual and legal issues, the acceptance or rejection of evidence, and
the judge’s citation to public policy, religious principles, general
mores, popular opinion, and cultural norms. In appellate cases,
dissenting and concurring opinions often provide critical insights on
both the expressed and unexpressed rationales for the majority’s
decision.
Ranking the models of judicial decision making relative to judicial
independence is also a challenging task. The list in Table 1, which
assigns ranks to each model from most to least independent, works
within the confines of this Article, although empiricists and other
scholars who explore judicial decision making may disagree with the
short-hand definitions assigned each model or the relative position of
each model.
1

Formalism

2

Balanced
Realism

3

Constrained
Pragmatism

4

Realism

Judge mechanically applies facts to established
rule(s) of law, rendering decision free of judicial bias.
Judge renders decision informed primarily by unique
facts and law of the case, although factors such as
political ideology may influence the decision; judge is
aware of potential biases and tries to control for
them.
Judge decides cases on narrow grounds, especially
when law is uncertain or evolving, considering
impact on institutions and society as well as parties.
Judge determines outcome first, then selects facts
and laws that support judge’s desired outcome.

188. In a perfect world the evaluator would possess an encyclopedic
knowledge of the “rule of law” that was (or should have been) applied in
the case, conduct a painstaking review of all evidence to determine
whether the court made appropriate weight and credibility
determinations, and be able to consider the decision in light of the entire
body of decisions rendered by the judge. Because we do not live in a
perfect world, the system described in Part I has been employed.
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5

Pragmatism

6

Attitudinal

7

Strategic

8

Oracle

Judge gives equal or greater weight to the potential
overall impact of decision on institutions and society
rather than securing just result for the litigants in
the case or strictly adhering to precedent.189
Judge decides case based on ideological attitudes and
personal values including religious and political
influences.
Appellate judge votes in a manner that advances the
jurist’s larger goals, for example, by trading his or
her vote in a case about which the judge does not
feel strongly to secure a colleague’s vote on a case of
greater importance to the judge; strategic model may
also be employed by agreeing on a second (or third)
favorite resolution of a case to avoid an outcome the
judge dislikes even more, even though the judge
believes the decision in which he or she is concurring
is flawed.
Judge divines result of case from largely common law
“mystical body of permanent truths.”190

Table 1: Judicial decision-making models ranked closest (1) to
furthest (8) from judicial independence.

While these definitions provide one tool for helping us understand
why judges render specific decisions, all judicial decision-making
models below constrained pragmatism on Table 1 can arguably fall so
far short of the ideal of judicial independence that their relative
rankings are not particularly meaningful.
B.Demonstrative Failures of Judicial Independence

Professor Rivera employed a double entendre when characterizing
U.S. judges who decided cases affecting LGBT equality prior to 1980
as “straight-laced.”191 No data exist about the sexual orientation of
these judges, but it is logical to conclude that the vast majority, and
perhaps all of them, were heterosexual, or, in the vernacular,
straight.192 In addition, these judges often personified the term
189. This categorization of pragmatism is not intended to suggest that judges
should never consider the larger impact of their decisions, especially in
cases where the law is unclear or evolving. But it does suggest that
courts should not routinely sacrifice the rights of litigants in an effort to
shape society and institutions in the manner desired by the judge.
190. White, supra note 37, at 10.
191. Rivera I, supra note 1, at 799. Also note that most cases were decided
by judges rather than juries because they involved domestic relations
matters, constitutional challenges, or both.
192. Cf. Juliet Eilperin, First Gay U.S. Appeals Judge Confirmed, Wash.
Post, Sept. 25, 2013, at A2 (noting that just seven openly gay judges
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straitlaced,193 as they routinely relied on puritanical religious and
moral codes condemning homosexuality as determinative of the legal
issues before them.194 The judges readily embraced an attitudinal
model of decision making by relying on and reinforcing negative
stereotypes of non-heterosexual litigants. The ideal of judicial
independence—the objective evaluation of the specific facts of the case
and the legal authorities that would likely command a different result
for non-LGBT litigants—was seriously damaged by this approach.
Historically, judges characterized gay and lesbian individuals as
undesirable “others” whose presumed sexual perversion, criminal
propensities, and mental instability warranted disenfranchisement not
only from legal rights and benefits but from basic dignity and respect
as well.195 Regardless of the evidence actually adduced at trial,
automatic condemnation of homosexuals by judicial officers was the
norm. The attitudinal model was particularly evident in domestic
had been confirmed as federal district judges prior to Hughes’s
appointment).
193. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1232 (11th ed.
2003) (defining the term to mean “excessively strict in manners, morals,
or opinion”); see also Straitlaced Definition, Merriam-Webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/straitlaced (last visited
Mar. 23, 2014) (offering words like “Victorian” and “puritanical” as
synonyms).
194. Judges often cited their state’s sodomy laws as proof that a gay or
lesbian litigant was automatically a criminal and thus unworthy of equal
rights under the law. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995), is
a case in point. Sharon Bottoms was raising her son with her female
partner when Sharon’s mother sued for custody. The trial judge
awarded custody to the grandmother and opined: “I will tell you first
that the mother’s conduct is illegal. It is a Class 6 felony in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. I will tell you that it is the opinion of this
Court that her conduct is immoral. And it . . . renders her an unfit
parent.” Id. at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court
opinion) (internal quotations omitted). The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed, reiterating that the “[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is
punishable as a . . . felony.” Id. at 108 (majority opinion). While the
often contentious relationship of legality and morality is beyond the
scope of this article, it is worth noting that no evidence was presented in
Bottoms or the other cases that relied on the sodomy laws
demonstrating that the litigants had engaged in the illegal behavior
prohibited by the relevant sodomy statute. In addition, the specific
behaviors forbidden by sodomy laws varied widely, and the laws were
very rarely enforced, thus suggesting that the moral and religious
motivations that initially supported enactment of sodomy laws no longer
had community support. See generally Cain, supra note 2, at 1587–1608
(describing far-reaching negative effects of sodomy statutes on lesbian
and gay litigants).
195. See generally Nussbaum, supra note 8 (discussing the idea that much
legal discrimination against gays and lesbians is motivated by disgust).
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relations cases, especially those involving child custody and visitation
issues.196 One scholar who studied this phenomenon concluded that
even parents imprisoned for committing serious crimes were “treated
to less spurious moralizing and discrimination” than were homosexual
parents.197 As the new millennium dawned, Professor Rivera revisited
196. See, e.g., Susan J. Becker, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Against a
Lesbian or Gay Parent in a Custody or Visitation Dispute: Battling the
Overt and Insidious Bias of Experts and Judges, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev.
75 (1996).
197. Anne T. Payne, The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody and
Parental Rights of Homosexual, Mentally Retarded, Mentally Ill and
Incarcerated Parents, 16 J. Fam. L. 797, 818 (1977); see also, e.g., Ex
parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Ex parte
D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998)) (affirming custody change
from mother to father due to mother’s lesbian relationship because
mother had “chosen to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle that
is ‘neither legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its
citizens’”); Evans v. Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 568 n.1, 572 (1960)
(conditioning a former husband’s supervised visits with children on his
moving out of the home he shared with his male partner, moving into
his parent’s home, and obtaining ongoing psychiatric help and holding
that his wife was not in contempt of custody order for moving children
to another state with her new husband because she was “endeavoring to
establish a normal home” for the children); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 67
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (relying on speculation of potential harm offered by
a court-appointed psychologist, despite no showing of harm when the
case was decided, to reverse a mother’s custody award due to the
possibility that her lesbianism may harm the child in the future); H. v.
H., 157 A.2d 721, 726 (N.J. Super Ct. 1959) (finding that a wife’s
homosexuality constituted extreme cruelty justifying divorce because
“[a]dded to the insult of sexual disloyalty per se . . . is the natural
revulsion arising from the knowledge . . . that the spouse’s betrayal
takes the form of perversion”); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860–61
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (concluding that “the homosexual relationship
admittedly carried on by the respondent mother and [mother’s lesbian
partner] in the apartment where the infant child . . . resides, creates an
improper environment for this child,” justifying custody change to
father and limiting mother’s visitation with child to situations where no
other homosexuals are present); In re Charles Mara, 150 N.Y.S.2d 524,
525–26 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1956) (allowing wife who took in
homosexual boarder to retain custody of children but placing children
under court supervision to make sure children “are not subjected to any
unwholesome or immoral influence” and further requiring psychiatric
examination of children to determine whether such influence has already
occurred); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981)
(confirming that homosexuality is “a significant factor to be considered
in determining the custody of children”); Roberts v. Roberts, 489
N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the trial court
abused its discretion by not imposing severe restrictions on a
homosexual father’s visits with his three children and remanding the
case with the suggestion that the only alternative may be “to terminate
visitation until the children attain such an age that they will not be
harmed or influenced by learning of their father’s homosexuality”);
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the rights and opportunities afforded LGBT citizens in this county.
After noting significant gains, Professor Rivera pondered whether “the
glass may be half empty rather than half full.”198
In short, volumes of cases attest to the judiciary’s willingness to
embrace and affirm stereotypical characterizations of homosexuals as
sexually perverted and psychologically unstable.199 These attitudinally
driven decisions continued despite case-specific evidence explicitly
M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982) (concluding that the
trial court did not err by stripping lesbian mother of custody because
her son might be harmed during his adolescent years when he has to
reconcile conflicting views of homosexuality and morality espoused by
his mother and by society); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 10
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (concluding that “[t]here are sufficient social,
moral and legal distinctions between the traditional heterosexual family
relationship and illicit homosexual relationship to raise the presumption
of regularity in favor of the licit, when established, shifting to the illicit,
the burden of disproving detriment to the children”); Commonwealth ex
rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952)
(awarding a wife exclusive custody of a couple’s two children and
allowing her to decide whether bisexual former husband would be
allowed visitation, even though record showed that children were not
exposed to husband’s sexuality or harmed by it and reasoning that “the
absence of harmful influences in the past does not eliminate the
probabilities of the future”); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)
(holding that a homosexual “father’s continuous exposure of the child to
his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper
custodian,” and further stating that the father’s “unfitness is manifested
by his willingness to impose” on his children the social condemnation
associated with homosexuality “in exchange for his own gratification”).
In addition to domestic relations disputes, courts lessened the burden of
proof for establishing harm due to homosexuality in other types of cases,
including employment and immigration. See, e.g., Schlegel v. United
States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (affirming legitimacy of
plaintiff’s employment termination on rationale that a homosexual’s
presence would undermine morale and efficiency of workplace because
fellow employees know “that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent,
lewd, and obscene”); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d
1340, 1345–46 (Wash. 1977) (affirming termination of a teacher despite
twelve years of excellent evaluations because “[h]omosexuality is widely
condemned as immoral and was so condemned as immoral during
biblical times,” because teacher indicated no intent to change, and
because he “made a voluntary choice for which he must be held morally
responsible”).
198. Rivera II, supra note 1, at 1187.
199. See cases cited supra note 197; see also People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S.
565, 567 (Magis. Ct. 1929) (condemning the tragic tales of the same-sex
couples described in The Well of Loneliness, Radclyffe Hall, The
Well of Loneliness (1928), as obscene due to the “unnatural and
depraved relationships portrayed” and the book’s alleged subtext of
justifying “the right of a pervert to prey upon normal members of a
community”).
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contradicting the stereotypes of gay men and lesbians that judges
willingly embraced.200 This judicial mindset is especially well
documented in cases where same-sex couples sought recognition of
and legal protection for their relationships. A trilogy of California
cases illustrates judges’ traditional reluctance to acknowledge that
homosexual relationships are based on anything other than sexual
conduct.201
In its groundbreaking decision in Marvin v. Marvin,202 the
Supreme Court of California identified legal and equitable principles
providing for the distribution of property acquired in nonmarital
relationships.203 The court rejected the rationales used by the trial
court and courts in other jurisdictions to deny recognition of
nonmarital relationships including public policy favoring marriage,
traditional moral norms, and analogies to prostitution.
The heterosexual couple in Marvin had cohabitated for seven
years. Marriage was impossible because one of the principals, actor
Lee Marvin, remained married to another woman during part of the
cohabitation. When Lee’s nonmarital relationship with Michelle failed,
Michelle sued for half the value of Lee’s property and enforcement of
his alleged promise of continued financial support in exchange for her
promise to sacrifice her career and “devote her full time to
defendant . . . as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook.”204
California’s Supreme Court held “that a contract between
nonmarital partners will be enforced unless expressly and inseparably
based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services.”205 Even without
a contract, the court declared that a nonmarital partner may be
entitled to remuneration under implied contract, partnership or joint
venture, and constructive or resulting trusts.206 “Finally,” the court
concluded, “a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for
the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable
200. The stereotype affirmation cases also reflect the courts’ uneasy
relationship with science in general and the social sciences—including
psychology in particular. See generally Becker, supra note 8, at 231–49
(discussing the tension and interaction between science and the law,
specifically with regard to discrimination against gay men and lesbians).
201. This judicial reluctance has also been obvious in the courts of other
states. See In re Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (documenting the eight-year legal battle of Karen Thomson to
become the legal guardian of her partner after her partner suffered
irreversible brain damage in an automobile accident).
202. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
203. Id. at 110.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 114.
206. Id. at 122.
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value of support received if he can show that he rendered services
with the expectation of monetary reward.”207
The broad equitable and legal relief Marvin announced was not
expressly limited to heterosexual partners, but courts resisted its
application to homosexual partners. In Jones v. Daly,208 for example,
the plaintiff asserted facts striking similar to those asserted by
Michelle Marvin. Plaintiff claimed that he gave up his career to
“render his services as a lover, companion, homemaker, traveling
companion, housekeeper and cook”209 in exchange for his partner’s
express promise to “furnish financial support to plaintiff for the rest of
his life.”210 Because Jones’s complaint referred to his role as Daly’s
lover, the California appeals court held that his “allegations clearly
show that plaintiff’s rendition of sexual services to Daly was an
inseparable part of the consideration for the ‘cohabitors agreement,’
and indeed was the predominant consideration.”211 Applying Marvin’s
rule that compensation cannot be received for sexual services, the
court held that Jones could not prevail on any legal or equitable
theory.212
The Jones Court’s citation of the Marvin rule denying
reimbursement for a partner’s sexual services is accurate. The court’s
distinction between the sexual services provided by the respective
plaintiffs in Marvin and Jones is not.
Michelle Marvin’s sexual services to her heterosexual partner no
doubt played an integral role in their heterosexual cohabitation
agreement. She described the agreement as requiring the couple to act
as “husband and wife,” a relationship commonly assumed to involve
sex.213 Indeed, the Marvin court’s lengthy refutation of defendant’s
argument that awarding the relief his partner requested was
equivalent to rewarding prostitution acknowledges that sex was an
integral component of the Marvin cohabitation agreement.214 Despite
sex being a core component of the cohabitation agreement, the
Marvin court found the sexual services aspect of the agreement
severable and not an impediment to the relief the heterosexual
cohabitating plaintiff sought.

207. Id. at 122–23.
208. 122 Cal. App. 3d 500 (1981).
209. Id. at 505.
210. Id. Plaintiff’s claims in Jones were asserted against his partner’s estate,
but that does not change the nature of the claims per se.
211. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 511.
213. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
214. Id. at 112–16.
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In contrast, the Jones Court’s conclusion that the homosexual
cohabitating plaintiff’s sexual services were “the predominant
consideration” for the Jones-Daly cohabitation agreement is not
supported by any evidence other than allegations in Jones’s complaint
that Jones was serving as a “lover, companion, homemaker, traveling
companion, housekeeper and cook.”215 The court provided no
explanation as to why the inclusion of “lover” outweighed all five
other categories of services for which plaintiff sought compensation.
The court also construed the word “cohabiting” in Jones’s complaint
as “only” pertaining to sexual services, again without adequate
explanation.216 The Jones Court further failed to explain why it
ignored the Marvin mandate that “any severable portion of the
contract supported by independent consideration will still be
enforced.”217 As in Marvin, the Jones Court could have severed the
sacrifice by plaintiff of his career and his services as companion,
homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper, and cook from sexual
services and thus provided the relief sought.218
Finally, after relying exclusively on Jones’s complaint to
determine the relationship was all about sex, the Jones Court upheld
the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request to reframe his claims in an
amended complaint.219 In an analysis that would fail any first-year
civil procedure exam, the court held that it “would simply constitute
an idle act” to allow plaintiff to amend because the complaint filed
“shows on its face that the ‘cohabitors agreement’ is unenforceable.”220
In contrast, the Marvin Court recognized the major flaws in Marvin’s
complaint as the reason to allow her to amend her complaint and
obtain a remedy for the non-sexual services she provided.221
In short, the Jones Court’s selective reliance on the Marvin
decision and its denial of plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint
expose that opinion as a classic example of the attitudinal or realism
schools of judicial decision making.
Seven years later, another California court of appeal rejected the
Jones Court’s view that homosexual partners who entered a
cohabitation agreement were bargaining primarily for sexual services.
Like the plaintiffs in Marvin and Jones, the plaintiff in Whorton v.
215. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 508–09.
216. Id. at 508.
217. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114 (emphasis added).
218. Notably, some courts have indicated that severance would have been
proper. See Bergen v. Wood, 14 Cal. App. 4th 854, 859 (1993)
(concluding that Jones was “wrongly decided”).
219. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 510–11.
220. Id. at 511.
221. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 123.
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Dillingham222 claimed to have foregone educational and career
opportunities and provided numerous services for his now-former
partner in exchange for significant equity in his partner’s real estate
holdings and a promise of financial support for life.223 Unlike the
plaintiffs in Marvin and Jones, Whorton characterized the services he
provided as businesslike rather than personal.
More specifically, Whorton claimed that his “exclusive, full-time
occupation was to be Dillingham’s chauffeur, bodyguard, social and
business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate investments,
and to appear on his behalf when requested.”224 Whorton also alleged
he was obligated to “render labor, skills, and personal services for the
benefit of Dillingham’s business and investment endeavors.”225 In
addition, plaintiff claimed that he “was to be Dillingham’s constant
companion, confidant, traveling and social companion, and lover.”226
Finally, Whorton alleged that he and his partner had agreed “that
any portion of the agreement found to be legally unenforceable was
severable and the balance of the provisions would remain in full force
and effect.”227
Despite the artfully pleaded complaint, the trial court invoked the
Jones rationale, dismissing the case because the sexual services
Whorton provided were inseparable from his other contractual duties,
thus rendering the entire contract unenforceable. In Whorton, the
appellate court reversed:
The services which plaintiff alleges he agreed to and did provide
included being a chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, and partner
and counselor in real estate investments. If provided, these
services are of monetary value, and the type for which one
would expect to be compensated unless there is evidence of a
contrary intent. Thus, they are properly characterized as
consideration independent of the sexual aspect of the
relationship. By way of comparison, such services as being a
constant companion and confidant are not the type which are
usually monetarily compensated nor considered to have a
“value” for purposes of contract consideration, and, absent
peculiar circumstances, would likely be considered so
intertwined with the sexual relationship as to be inseparable.228
222. 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (1988).
223. Id. at 450.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 454.
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This passage from Whorton appears to be a model of judicial
independence because it applies the rules of Marvin to the complaint
without regard for the sexual orientation of the parties. It also
accurately recites the general contract rule that social niceties like
companionship and maintaining confidence constitute insufficient
consideration for a contract. But upon further inspection, fine cracks
appear in the veneer of judicial independence. For example, Marvin
recognized a number of equitable remedies in the cohabitating partner
scenario. Whorton makes no mention of those. In addition, while
providing companionship and serving as a confidant require that one
person devote time and attention to one’s partner, it does not
necessarily follow that such services are automatically intertwined
with sex.
Overall the Whorton decision moves much closer to the goal of
judicial independence than the Jones case. But the Whorton court’s
conflation of companionship and sex reflects the continuing and
significant influence of judicial attitudes that homosexual
relationships are almost exclusively about sex. This is a common
theme throughout the history of LGBT rights cases.229

III. Judicial Independence Shift in
LGBT Marriage Cases
The Supreme Court’s 2013 United States v. Windsor230 decision
makes marriage cases an appropriate and timely lens through which
to examine the ongoing shift in judicial decision-making models in
cases involving LGBT litigants.
229. See, e.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985)) (declaring in custody case that “the state has a substantial
interest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual behavior which
threatens the social fabric”); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 857 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976) (declaring that “innocent bystanders or
children . . . may be affected physically and emotionally by close contact
with homosexual conduct of adults,” even though no evidence of sexual
conduct was presented in that case); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No.
10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1343–44 (Wash. 1977) (upholding a teacher’s
dismissal for “immorality” because teacher “admitted his status as a
homosexual,” from which the court concluded that “it is unquestioned
that homosexual acts were participated in by him, although there was
no evidence of any overt act having been committed”). See generally
Nussbaum, supra note 8 (discussing the idea that much legal
discrimination against gays and lesbians is motivated by disgust);
Christopher Carnahan, Inscribing Lesbian and Gay Identities: How
Judicial Imaginations Intertwine with the Best Interests of Children, 11
Cardozo Women’s L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the need to both protect
the interests of children and avoid negatively treating homosexuals in
the law).
230. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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The Long Shadow of Baker v. Nelson
231

Baker v. Nelson is commonly acknowledged as the first reported
case challenging the heterosexual exclusivity of marriage. Richard
John Baker and James Michael McConnell argued that Minnesota’s
rejection of their marriage license application violated state and
federal constitutional provisions, including the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.232 The
Minnesota Supreme Court summarized plaintiffs’ arguments as an
“assertion that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the
parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that restricting
marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is irrational and
invidiously discriminatory.”233
Minnesota’s highest court readily acknowledged the U.S. Supreme
Court’s characterization of marriage as a “basic civil right” that is
“fundamental to our very existence and survival,”234 and that
constitutional guarantees of privacy surround the marriage
relationship.235 But the court found no reason to extend these bedrock
constitutional principles to a couple of the same sex.
To the contrary, the Baker Court concluded that “[t]he
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as
old as the book of Genesis.”236 The court found neither contemporary
concepts of marriage nor societal interests as justification for
modifying its Bible-based paradigm of marriage, concluding that
“[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a
charter for restructuring it by judicial legislation.”237
The Baker Court was unwavering in its reliance on procreation
and child rearing as its primary rationale for reserving marriage
exclusively for opposite sex couples, even though, as plaintiffs pointed
out, some married couples never procreate or raise children. “[T]he
classification is no more than theoretically imperfect,” the court
reasoned, further explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not demand “abstract symmetry.”238

231. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
232. Id. at 186.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 187 (citations omitted) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967)).
235. Id. at 186 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
236. Id. at 186.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 187.
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Minnesota’s Supreme Court expressed an equally firm conviction
that Loving v. Virginia,239 the U.S. Supreme Court decision that
declared antimiscegenation statutes contrary to Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantees, had no relevance to samesex marriage.240 The Baker court characterized racial discrimination as
“directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment,”241 and concluded that “in commonsense and
in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the
fundamental difference in sex.”242
The same-sex partners in Baker sought U.S. Supreme Court
review on the grounds that Minnesota’s denial of their marriage
license violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
fundamental right to marry, constituted gender discrimination in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and
denied their privacy rights grounded in the Ninth Amendment.243 The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal in a one-sentence order,
stating that the appeal was “dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question.”244
McConnell, one of the Baker plaintiffs, was subsequently denied
employment with the University of Minnesota for seeking a marriage
license. The federal district court analogized McConnell’s treatment
by the university to the witch hunts of homosexuals exercised during
the McCarthy era and concluded that such discriminatory treatment

239. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
240. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
241. Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12).
242. Id. at 187.
243. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 3, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S.
810 (1972) (No. 71-1027).
244. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. Because this case was before the Court pursuant
to a mandatory appeal, the precedential value of its dismissal has
engendered significant debate. See Note, Developments in the Law: The
Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1274 (1980)
(discussing whether Baker’s dismissal established that no federal
constitutional rights are implicated in a state’s denial of same-sex
marriage). Compare Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (finding that Baker does preclude federal constitutional
challenges to state laws banning same-sex marriage), with In re Kandu,
315 B.R. 123, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (concluding Baker is no
longer controlling in challenges to state same-sex marriage bans due to
subsequent Supreme Court opinions on equal protection grounds). The
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), does not fully resolve the continuing relevance of Baker because
it was based on a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a
federal law prohibiting same-sex marriage.
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violated McConnell’s liberty and property interests under the
Fourteenth Amendment.245 In McConnell v. Anderson,246 the Eighth
Circuit reversed, holding that a state university’s decision not to hire
McConnell due to his homosexuality did not constitute the “arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious” level of conduct required for courts to
intervene.247 The court held:
[I]t is at once apparent that this is not a case involving mere
homosexual propensities on the part of a prospective employee.
Neither is it a case in which an applicant is excluded from
employment because of a desire clandestinely to pursue
homosexual conduct. It is, instead, a case in which something
more than remunerative employment is sought; a case in which
the applicant seeks employment on his own terms; a case in
which the prospective employee demands, as shown both by the
allegations of the complaint and by the marriage license incident
as well, the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his
unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be
accorded homosexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of
this socially repugnant concept upon his employer, who is, in
this instance, an institution of higher learning. We know of no
constitutional fiat or binding principle of decisional law which
requires an employer to accede to such extravagant demands.248

In short, Baker and McConnell characterized a same-sex couple’s
request to marry as a “socially repugnant” and “extravagant
demand.”249 Other judges embraced this perspective.250 What cannot
be measured, of course, is the profound effect the Baker and
McDonnell decisions had in discouraging lesbian and gay activists
from pursuing marriage equality litigation for decades after those
cases were decided.

245. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814–15 (D. Minn. 1970).
246. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
247. Id. at 196.
248. Id. at 196. The Eighth Circuit also summarily rejected McConnell’s
argument that the University’s decision violated his First Amendment
right to speak on issues of political and social concern. Id. at 196 n.7.
249. Id. at 196.
250. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). As in the Nelson case, one of the
Singer plaintiffs was subject to employment discrimination for seeking a
marriage license with his same-sex partner. Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 530 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds,
429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
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More recently, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the federal
constitutional rights of gay men and lesbians in cases such as Romer
v. Evans251 and Lawrence v. Texas252 led federal courts to question
Baker’s apparent bar to federal constitutional marriage equality
claims.253 But Baker’s continued impact, if any, will not be fully
resolved until the Supreme Court resolves a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection challenge to a state’s denial of a same-sex couple’s
right to marry.254
B.

Pro-Equality State Decisions Prior to Windsor and Perry
1.

Hawaii’s Saga: Baehr v. Lewin

The Hawaii case of Baehr v. Lewin255 represents the first
significant victory for marriage equality advocates, albeit a short-lived
one. Baehr offers a classic example of judicial independence due to the
trial court’s: 1) full consideration of the extensive evidence plaintiffs
adduced to dismantle negative stereotypes about same-sex couples
and their parenting abilities; and 2) appropriate application of
established legal doctrine to that largely uncontroverted evidence.
Three same-sex couples denied marriage licenses alleged in Baehr
that the state’s rejection of their marriage applications violated
Hawaii’s constitutional guarantees of privacy, equal protection, and
due process. On October 1, 1991, the Baehr trial court dismissed the
251. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (concluding that a state constitutional amendment
denying gay and lesbian citizens opportunity to seek anti-discrimination
protection via local and state law violated Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection guarantees under rational basis analysis).
252. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring state sodomy laws unconstitutional due
to violation of federal constitutional privacy rights of gay men and
lesbians).
253. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that “Baker does not resolve our
own case but it does limit the arguments to ones that do not presume or
rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage”), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2884 (2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d
294, 307–09, 333 n.9 (D. Conn. 2012) (distinguishing the federal
constitutional issues in Baker as related to challenges to state law
banning marriage compared to federal law at issue in DOMA and
stating that “[a]rguably, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in
Romer and Lawrence reflect doctrinal developments that suggest the
Supreme Court would no longer consider the federal question in Baker
to be unsubstantial and therefore binding on lower courts”).
254. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), may telegraph the Court’s view that denial of marriage equality
violates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees, but
Windsor was resolved on Fifth Amendment equal protection grounds.
Accordingly it does not fully repudiate Baker.
255. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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couples’ complaint for failure to state a claim prior to any evidence
being submitted in the case.256 Hawaii’s Supreme Court reversed,
declaring the trial court’s dismissal inappropriate because the trial
court had made factual findings and rendered conclusions of law
instead of limiting its analysis to the face of the complaint.257 Rather
than merely remanding to the trial court, the court provided a
detailed analysis of same-sex marriage under the Hawaii Constitution.
In its plurality decision, Hawaii’s highest court found no
fundamental right to marriage “arising out of the right to privacy or
otherwise.”258 Two of the four justices, however, held that denial of
marriage licenses to persons of the same sex implicated Hawaii’s
explicit constitutional guarantee of equal protection based on sex,
thus requiring strict scrutiny of the state’s reasons for that denial.259
These two justices deemed the denial presumptively unconstitutional,
requiring the state to prove “compelling state interests” for excluding
same-sex couples from marrying and to demonstrate that “the statute
is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the applicant
couples’ constitutional rights.”260 The concurring judge also foresaw a
possible equal protection claim based on sex, but only if plaintiffs
could show that “heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and
asexuality are ‘biologically fated.’”261
At trial after remand,262 the state attempted to satisfy strict
scrutiny by asserting compelling state interests in: (1) promoting “the
optimal development of children,” further urging that “all things
being equal, it is best for a child that it be raised in a single home by
its parents, or at least by a married male and female”; (2) “securing
or assuring recognition of Hawaii marriages in other jurisdictions”;
and (3) “protecting the public fisc from the reasonably foreseeable
effects of approval of same-sex marriage.”263 Because the state
provided minimal (and ultimately unpersuasive) evidence on the
latter two points,264 the optimal environment for child-rearing became
the determinative issue.

256. Id. at 53.
257. Id. at 54.
258. Id. at 57.
259. Id. at 67.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 69–70 (Burns, J., concurring).
262. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
263. Id. at *3.
264. The dearth of evidence presented by the state on the financial
ramifications of marriage equality and possible conflict of laws issues is
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Defendants proffered the testimony of four expert witnesses to
support the state’s claimed interests in limiting marriage to oppositesex couples. One defense expert claiming psychology credentials was
disqualified from testifying about alleged methodological flaws in
social science studies on same-sex families due to his belief that all
“modern psychology is so flawed that no fix, reconciliation or
overhaul can correct it.”265 The other three defense experts provided
significant support for plaintiffs’ arguments that no compelling
rationale exists for treating same-sex couples differently than their
heterosexual counterparts.
Defense experts tried to stress the importance of having both a
mother and a father to a child’s development, but they readily
conceded that gay and lesbian parents can and do make excellent
parents. Based on research and his own clinical experience, for
example, child psychiatrist Dr. Kyle Pruett conceded that “the
beneficial results described above are not essential to being a happy,
healthy and well-adjusted child”;266 “in general, gay and lesbian
parents are as fit and loving parents as non-gay persons and
couples”;267 “same-sex couples should be allowed to adopt children,
provide foster care and to take children in and raise and care for
them”;268 and “the quality of the nurturing relationship between
parent and child could, and would, outweigh any limitation or burden
imposed on the child as a result of having same-sex parents.”269
Defense experts also agreed that children of same-sex couples would
greatly benefit from the legal and social benefits associated with their
parents’ marriages.270
Based on their extensive clinical experience and academic studies
of families headed by same-sex couples, plaintiffs’ four experts
confirmed that same-sex couples provide excellent environments for
addressed in the trial court’s “Specific Findings” (¶¶ 117, 118) and
“Conclusions of Law” (¶¶ 12, 13). Id. at *16, 19–20.
265. Id. at *8 (excluding testimony of Dr. Richard Williams).
266. Id. at *4. Defense expert and sociologist Dr. David Eggebeen also
conceded that “same-sex couples can create stable family environments
and raise healthy and well-adjusted children.” Id. at *7.
267. Id. at *5. Defense expert and psychologist Dr. Thomas Merrill similarly
stated that “that the sexual orientation of a parent is not an indication
of parental fitness” and that “gay and lesbian couples with children do
have successful relationships.” Id. at *10.
268. Id. at *5. Defense expert Dr. David Eggebeen similarly acknowledged
that gay and lesbian parents “should be allowed to adopt children and
serve as foster parents.” Id. at *8.
269. Id. at *5.
270. Id. at *8 (relating the testimony of defense expert Dr. David Eggebeen);
id. at *10 (relating the testimony of defense expert Dr. Thomas Merrill).
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their children.271 One of plaintiffs’ experts, pediatrician Dr. Robert
Bidwell, admitted that children of nontraditional families may
experience some discomfort from being different, but explained that
such discomfort will not necessarily harm the child. All children wish
on occasion for their parents to be different, Dr. Bidwell explained,
but that “doesn’t do developmental damage to these kids.”272 “If
anything, it creates strength and promotes growth.”273
Based on the virtually undisputed evidence that same-sex couples
are effective parents and that both parents and children would benefit
greatly from state recognition and support of their families, the court
found no compelling state reason justifying the state’s denial of
marriage to them.274 Following extensive findings of fact, the Baehr
trial court summarized its evidentiary conclusion. “Simply put,” the
court explained, “Defendant has failed to establish or prove that the
public interest in the well-being of children and families, or the
optimal development of children will be adversely affected by samesex marriage.”275
In this classic exercise of judicial independence, the Baehr trial
court then applied established Hawaiian constitutional law principles
to its well-documented findings of fact. Although marriage was not
recognized as a fundamental right in Hawaii,276 plaintiffs had a viable
constitutional challenge grounded in the state’s constitutional

271. Id. at *10–16. Plaintiffs experts were: (1) sociologist Dr. Pepper
Schwartz, described by the court as “an expert in sociology and
interdisciplinary studies of sexuality with a special expertise in gender
and human sexuality, marriage and the family, and same-sex relations in
parenting and research”; (2) Dr. Charlotte Patterson, a University of
Virginia professor specializing in the “psychology of child development
with a special expertise in lesbian and gay parenting and the
development of children of lesbian and gay parents”; (3) Dr. David
Brodzinsky, a clinical psychologist with an academic appointment at
Rutgers University with expertise in “adoption and other forms of
nonbiological parenting and the development of children raised by
nonbiological parents”; and (4) Dr. Robert Bidwell, a pediatrician with
a subspecialty in adolescent medicine who “teaches medical students
and pediatric residents in training, provides patient care, and practices
adolescent medicine and general pediatrics at Kapiolani Medical
Center.” Id. at *11–15.
272. Id. at *16.
273. Id.
274. The court also found that the state had failed to provide sufficient
evidence of damage to the state’s fisc or adverse harm to Hawaii if other
states failed to recognize Hawaii’s same-sex marriage couples. Id. at *16.
275. Id. at *18.
276. Id. at *19. Hawaiian marriage is a “legal status which gives rise to
certain rights and benefits” rather than a fundamental right. Id.
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guarantee against sex-based discrimination.277 The evidentiary record
unequivocally demonstrated that the state had not met its burden
under strict scrutiny to demonstrate “compelling state interests” for
the denial or to show that the statutory exclusion had been “narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.”278
The trial court concluded:
Defendant has failed to present sufficient credible evidence
which demonstrates that the public interest in the well-being of
children and families, or the optimal development of children
would be adversely affected by same-sex marriage. Nor has
Defendant demonstrated how same-sex marriage would
adversely affect the public fisc, the state interest in assuring
recognition of Hawaii marriages in other states, the institution
of traditional marriage, or any other important public or
governmental interest.279

The Baehr litigation stands both as a model of judicial independence
and as a testament to the need for an independent judiciary to
counter the majoritarian trampling of minority rights. This landmark
case created a firestorm of backlash, fueling the passage of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 and this amendment to the Hawaiian
Constitution: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”280 As the Supreme Court of Hawaii
explained, the amendment validated the statute struck down by the
trial court “by taking the statute out of the ambit of the equal
protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution, at least insofar as the
statute, both on its face and as applied, purported to limit access to
the marital status to opposite-sex couples.”281
277. Id. at *19.
278. Id. at *19.
279. Id. at *21. The court also rejected the argument that allowing same-sex
couples to marry will lead inevitably to legalization of incest, polygamy,
and prostitution because that argument “disregards existing statutes
and established precedent” and overlooks the language in the Hawaiian
Supreme Court’s decision remanding this case which acknowledged
“compelling reasons to prevent and prohibit marriage under
circumstances such as incest.” Id. at *20 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 59 n.19 (Haw. 1993)).
280. Haw. Const. art I, § 23. The amendment was passed by Hawaii’s
House and Senate in 1997 and ratified by voters in 1998. Id.
281. Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 (Haw. 1999).
More than two decades after the Baehr litigation began, the battle for
marriage equality in Hawaii appeared to end on November 13, 2013,
with the governor’s signature of legislation extending marriage to samesex couples. See Doug Mataconis, Hawaii About to Legalize Same-Sex
Marriage: What a Difference 20 Years Makes, Outside the Beltway
(Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/hawaii-about-to-lega
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2.

Massachusetts, California, and Iowa Equality Decisions

In the two decades following the Hawaii Supreme Court’s initial
Baehr decision, marriage equality advocates experienced significant
victories and stunning setbacks. The majority of setbacks were
delivered not by judges but by legislators and voters who locked
marriage inequality into state constitutions and federal statutes.282
Many state constitutional amendments extended beyond marriage
bans to preclude any form of relationship recognition for same-sex
couples, including comprehensive domestic partnerships and
civil unions.283
In sharp contrast, some judges demonstrated their commitment to
judicial independence by being receptive to the legal and factual
arguments advanced for marriage equality. As a result of the
“uncommon portion of fortitude”284 exhibited by these judges,
lize-same-sex-marriage-what-a-difference-20-years-makes/ (providing a
succinct explanation of national and state consequences of Hawaii’s 1993
Baehr decision). Because Hawaii’s constitution empowers the state
legislature to revoke the right of same-sex couples to marry, same-sex
couples are pursuing litigation alleging that the federal constitution
prohibits the state legislature from ever reversing its current marriage
equality stance. The plaintiffs prevailed at the trial level. See Jackson v.
Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Hawaii 2012). As of September
2014, the case was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Updates on Jackson and on all marriage equality cases pending in the
United States are available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/pendingmarriage-equality-cases.
282. As of December 2013, twenty states had constitutional amendments
prohibiting same-sex marriage and other forms of relationship
recognition: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Where State Laws Stand, Freedom to
Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand
(last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter State Laws]. The constitutional
amendments in nine states only prohibit marriage by same-sex couples
but do not outlaw other forms of relationship recognition: Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
and Tennessee. Four states—Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and
Wyoming—have statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples but
no constitutional bans. Id. As of September 1996, the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) barred the federal government from recognizing
same-sex marriages for the purpose of federal laws, obligations, and
benefits and provided that no state had to recognize marriages of samesex couples legally performed in other states. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)
(governing federal law), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (applicable to states).
283. State Laws, supra note 282.
284. This term is employed by Alexander Hamilton when articulating the
need for independent judiciary to safeguard minority rights. The
Federalist No. 78, supra note 16, at 509 (Alexander Hamilton).
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marriage equality became a reality in Massachusetts,285 California,286
Connecticut,287 and Iowa.288 Each case featured an evidentiary record
similar to the record established in the Baehr litigation applied to
equal protection and other rights established by state constitutions.
The Supreme Court of Iowa’s unanimous decision in Varnum v.
O’Brien289 is illustrative of these courts’ application of the rule of law
to the credible evidence of record.
Evidence proffered in Varnum including the following:
The
twelve
plaintiffs
are,
“[l]ike
most
Iowans, . . . responsible, caring, and productive individuals”
who “are contributing, benevolent members of their
communities.” 290
“Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope
to have children.”291
“Despite the commonality shared with other Iowans, the
twelve plaintiffs are different from most in one way. They
are sexually and romantically attracted to members of their
own sex.”292
Plaintiffs’ exclusion from the rights, benefits, and
responsibilities associated with marriage places them at a
distinct disadvantage compared to their heterosexual
counterparts including “the ultimate disadvantage” of “the
inability to obtain for themselves and for their children the
personal and public affirmation that accompanies
marriage.”293

285. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Mass.
2003).
286. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
287. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
288. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 872.
291. Id.
292. Id. The court also rejected the state’s argument that same-sex couples
are not “similarly situated” to heterosexual couples because evidence
unequivocally established that “for purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws,
which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of
committed couples and their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are
similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual
orientation.” Id. at 883–84.
293. Id. at 873.
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Plaintiffs’ argument that “same-sex couples can raise
children as well as opposite-sex couples” is confirmed by
“the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological
Association, the National Association of Social Workers,
and the Child Welfare League of America.”294

The well-established state constitutional and other legal principles
identified in Varnum included the following:
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Iowa Constitution has a
blueprint for government that establishes “three separate,
but equal, branches of government and delineates the
limited roles and powers of each branch.”295
The Iowa Supreme Court “has the responsibility to
determine if the law enacted by the legislative branch and
enforced by the executive branch violates the Iowa
Constitution.”296
“A statute inconsistent with the Iowa Constitution must
be declared void, even though it may be supported by
strong and deep seated traditional beliefs and popular
opinion.”297
“The framers of the Iowa Constitution knew, as did the
drafters of the United States Constitution, that ‘times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress.’”298
“The primary constitutional principle at the heart of this
case is the doctrine of equal protection,” a concept that
history reveals as “often expressed far more easily than it is
practiced.”299
“Like the Federal Equal Protection Clause found in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
Iowa’s constitutional promise of equal protection ‘is

294. Id. at 873–74.
295. Id. at 875.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 876 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003)).
299. Id. at 876–77.
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essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.’”300
In deference to the legislature, a presumption exists that
the marriage statute is constitutional and plaintiffs bear
“the heavy burden” of negating “every reasonable basis
upon which the classification may be sustained.”301
Based on the general guidance provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court for identifying the appropriate level of equal
protection scrutiny, the more specific analyses provided in
state court decisions resolving marriage equality claims, and
Iowa precedent, Iowa’s exclusions of same-sex couples from
marriage may be subject to strict scrutiny analysis.302
However, application of that standard is not necessary
because the exclusion cannot even satisfy intermediate
scrutiny.303
“‘To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important
governmental objective.’”304

Applying these legal principles to the evidentiary record before it, the
Varnum Court unanimously concluded that preservation of tradition
is not an adequate state interest to deny marriage to same-sex
couples. “If a simple showing that discrimination is traditional
satisfies equal protection,” the court reasoned, “previous successful
equal protection challenges of invidious racial and gender
classifications would have failed.”305
While acknowledging that promoting children’s best interests is
an important governmental objective, the court also found “an
abundance of evidence and research” supporting “the proposition that
the interests of children are served equally by same-sex parents and
opposite-sex parents.”306 Similarly, while the state has a valid interest
300. Id. at 878 (citation omitted) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
301. Id. at 879 (citation omitted).
302. Id. at 885–97.
303. Id. at 896.
304. Id. (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
305. Id. at 898.
306. Id. at 899. The Court further observed that banning only same-sex
marriages is under-inclusive in promoting optimal child rearing because
the statute does not ban marriages of those who have a record of bad
parenting and over-inclusive because it bans marriage of same-sex
couples who do not intend to have children. Id. at 899–901. “In the
end,” the Varnum court concluded, “a careful analysis of the over- and
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in procreation to ensure “the continuation of the human race,”307
“[g]ay and lesbian persons are capable of procreation,”308 and
heterosexual couples who “do not procreate for reasons such as age,
physical disability, or choice”309 are not precluded from marrying.
The Varnum court recognized promotion of stable opposite-sex
relationships through marriage as an important government
objective, but found no proof that excluding gay and lesbian couples
from marriage stabilized their heterosexual counterparts.310 Similarly,
conservation of state resources proved insufficient grounds for the
challenged marriage exclusion because exclusion of “any group from
civil marriage—African-Americans, illegitimates, aliens, even redhaired individuals—would conserve state resources in an equally
‘rational’way.”311 In addition, excluding Iowa’s approximately 5,800
couples from same-sex marriage would be both underinclusive because
“conservation of state resources would be equally served by excluding
any similar-sized group”312 and overinclusive “because many samesex couples, if allowed to marry, would not use more state resources
than they currently consume as unmarried couples.”313
“Our equal protection clause requires more than has been offered
to justify the continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban under
the statute,”314 the Varnum court concluded. “To decide otherwise
would be an abdication of our constitutional duty.”315
While state constitutional law compelled Hawaii’s Baehr court to
apply strict scrutiny and Iowa’s Varnum Court to employ
intermediate scrutiny316 to test the constitutionality of excluding
under-inclusiveness of the statute reveals it is less about using marriage
to achieve an optimal environment for children and more about merely
precluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage.” Id. at 901.
307. Id. at 901.
308. Id. at 902.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 903.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 904.
315. Id. at 906; see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
412, 481 (Conn. 2008) (explaining the judiciary’s duty to ascertain the
constitutionality of legislative enactments and concluding that “we do
not exceed our authority by mandating equal treatment for gay persons;
in fact, any other action would be an abdication of our responsibility”).
316. Connecticut’s Supreme Court also applied intermediate scrutiny to
strike down that state’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412, 480.
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same-sex couples from marriage, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,317
evaluated plaintiffs’ equal protection claims under the rational basis
test.318 To survive rationale basis scrutiny, the state only had to
convince the court that “an impartial lawmaker could logically believe
that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.”319
Even under that highly deferential test, Goodridge held that the
state’s purported rationales of promoting procreation, providing an
optimal environment for children, and conserving state resources fell
far short of justifying marriage inequality.320 The Goodridge Court
concluded:
The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality
of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.
In reaching our conclusion we have given full deference to the
arguments made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed to
identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil
marriage to same-sex couples.321

The foregoing explications of Baehr, Varnum, and Goodridge
demonstrate that each court applied well-established legal principles
to an extensive record of highly credible evidence to reject antiquated
rationales for excluding same-sex couples from secular marriage. In so
doing, the judges often addressed factors external to the law and facts
that had previously influenced judicial decision making in cases
involving LGBT litigants, including religion, the judge’s personal
sense of morality, and public opinion.
The Varnum court, for example, acknowledged that “[w]hether
expressly or impliedly, much of society rejects same-sex marriage due
to sincere, deeply ingrained—even fundamental—religious belief.”322
The court also observed that “other equally sincere groups and people
in Iowa and around the nation have strong religious views that yield
the opposite conclusion.”323 Reiterating that the Iowa Constitution’s
Establishment Clause expressly prohibits the courts from resolving
such religious disputes, the court explained that its determination of
317. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
318. Id. at 961.
319. Id. at 960 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 452 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing English
v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 333 (1989)).
320. Id. at 961–65.
321. Id. at 948.
322. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009).
323. Id. at 905.

919

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence

the “class of persons entitled to secular rights and benefits associated
with civil marriage”324 had no impact on the power of religious
denominations to continue to “define marriage as a union between a
man and a woman.”325
Even though the state had not asserted religious liberty as a
justification for denying marriage to same-sex couples, the California
Supreme Court raised and then rejected the possibility that the
constitutional rights of citizens whose religious views preclude
acceptance of homosexuality would be infringed by that court’s
marriage equality decision. “[N]o religion will be required to change its
religious policies or practices with regard to same-sex couples,” the
court explained, “and no religious officiant will be required to
solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs.”326
Goodridge similarly recognized that religion and other influences
that commonly shape public opinion should not sway the court. In the
second paragraph of its very lengthy opinion, the court acknowledged
that many people hold deep-seated “religious, moral, and ethical
convictions” regarding marriage equality, thus resulting in deep
sociological and political divides on the issue.327 The court rejected the
possibility that public policy favoring or condemning marriage
equality should shape its opinion, clarifying that its “concern is with
the Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance for every
person properly within its reach,”328 further declaring that “[o]ur
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code.”329
Based on application of the rule of law to the evidence presented
and rejection of constitutionally irrelevant but potentially powerful
external factors, these marriage equality decisions model the type of
judicial independence to which judges should aspire. Rendering these
decisions required significant courage, and three of the seven judges in
Varnum were rewarded for their independence by being ousted from

324. Id.; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 (reporting that “[i]n
Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been,
precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular institution”).
325. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 906.
326. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008) (citing Cal.
Const. art. I, § 4). The California Constitution states that “[f]ree
exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference
are guaranteed” and that laws “respecting an establishment of religion”
are prohibited. Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.
327. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
328. Id.
329. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).
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office in a retention election.330 Still, former Iowa Supreme Court
Justice Marcus Ternus would not have compromised her
constitutional duty to recognize marriage equality in exchange for
success at the ballot box. True independence requires a “judiciary
that is committed to the rule of law, independent of—free of—outside
influence, including personal bias or preference,”331 Justice Ternus
explained. “Only an independent judiciary can ensure that the
minority is protected from the tyranny of the majority.”332
2.

Lower Federal Court DOMA Decisions Prior to Windsor

The inequities codified by section 3 of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act333 (DOMA) became increasingly clear as more states
embraced marriage equality.334 Continued enforcement of DOMA’s bar
to federal rights and benefits for same-sex married couples created
two distinct marital classes. Opposite-sex couples continued to enjoy a
privileged status accompanied by all the legal rights and benefits
associated with marriage at both the state and federal levels.335 Samesex married couples were relegated to a second-tier status limited to
state rights and benefits. DOMA’s codification of this unequal status
was declared unconstitutional in nine federal court decisions rendered
between July 2010 and October 2012.336 The glaring inequality

330. The campaign expressly targeted Chief Justice Marsha Ternus, Justice
Michael Streit, and Justice David Baker based on their Varnum decision
and was funded extensively by out-of-state funds from anti-equality
groups. Curriden, supra note 154, at 56; A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of
Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bush, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1; see
also Pettys, supra note 154 (presenting a comprehensive review of the
judge’s retention battle).
331. Ternus, supra note 10, at 480.
332. Id. at 487.
333. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
334. DOMA mandates that “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
335. There are 1,138 federal statutory provisions “in which marital status is a
factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges.” Letter
from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, to Bill
First, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/search?q=GAO-04-353R (further detailing the
specific provisions of the code that DOMA affects).
336. The nine decisions consist of one bankruptcy court decision, six district
court decisions, and two circuit court decisions. The First Circuit’s
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occasioned by DOMA also resulted in the Department of Justice’s
decision to no longer defend the legislation against constitutional
attack.337 As a result, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Committee (BLAG) intervened to defend DOMA in
numerous ongoing cases.338
Case
Golinski v. U.S. Office of
Personnel Management339
Pedersen v. Office of
Personnel Management340
Dragovich v. U.S. Department
of Treasury341

Judge
Jeffrey White

Appointing President
George W. Bush

Vanessa Bryant

George W. Bush

Claudia Wilkin

William J. Clinton

decision affirmed two cases brought on distinct grounds. See infra notes
339–351, accompanying text, and Table 2.
337. In February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the
Department of Justice would no longer defend DOMA’s
constitutionality because the Attorney General and President Obama
had concluded that heightened scrutiny should apply to sexual
orientation classifications and that DOMA’s prohibition of federal
recognition of same-sex couples’ marriages is unconstitutional under that
standard. The executive branch would, however, continue to enforce
DOMA. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A.
Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, at 5 (Feb. 23,
2011) [hereinafter Holder letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
338. On March 9, 2011, the U.S. House of Representative’s Bipartisan
Leadership Advisory Group (BLAG) voted 3–2, along party lines, to
direct the House General Counsel to defend DOMA in court. Press
Release, John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality is Determined by the Court
(Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://boehner.house.gov/news/documentsin
gle.aspx?DocumentID=228585. After hiring former Solicitor General
Paul Clement as lead counsel, BLAG successfully sought intervention in
pending federal cases to defend DOMA’s bar of federal recognition of
same-sex couples’ marriages. See Matthew I. Hall, How Congress Could
Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG Cannot), 65 Stan. L.
Rev. Online 92, 93–94 (2013) (explaining BLAG’s involvement in
DOMA defense).
339. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate level of review and that DOMA is unconstitutional
under that standard and under rational basis review).
340. 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012) (finding that legislation
disadvantaging federal employees, their same-sex spouses, and their
children should be subject to strict scrutiny, but applying rational basis
because: (1) the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a higher
standard; and (2) rationales offered to defend DOMA intent do not even
satisfy the lowly rational basis standards).
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In re Balas342
Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management343
Massachusetts v. U.S.
Department of Health and
Human Services344
Massachusetts v. U.S.
Department of Health and
Human Services345 (on appeal
at the First Circuit)
Windsor v. United States350

Eighteen Unanimous
Bankruptcy Judges
Joseph L. Tauro

(various)

Joseph L. Tauro

Richard M. Nixon

Michael Boudin346
Sandra Lee Lynch
Juan R. Torruella

George H.W. Bush347
William J. Clinton
Gerald R. Ford348 and
Ronald W. Reagan349
William J. Clinton

Barbara S. Jones

Richard M. Nixon

341. 872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying rational basis test to
determine that DOMA violates plaintiffs’ equal protection guarantee by
precluding same-sex married couples from participating in California
state employees’ long-term care insurance program maintained under
federal law).
342. 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding in a unanimous
decision of twenty bankruptcy judges that DOMA’s bar to filing joint
bankruptcy petitions by same-sex married couples violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and that this result is reached
under rational basis or heightened scrutiny analysis).
343. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (applying rational basis test to
conclude that DOMA’s unequal treatment of same-sex married couples
seeking federal employee benefits violated their Fifth Amendment equal
protection rights).
344. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (concluding that Congress’s
enactment of DOMA was not a legitimate exercise of its Spending
Clause authority because the legislation mandates that states treat
same-sex and opposite-sex married couples differently in violation of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees and that DOMA
violates the Tenth Amendment by impermissibly interfering with states’
rights to regulate marriage).
345. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding DOMA unconstitutional under a
rational basis standard), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013).
346. Judge Boudin wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel.
347. George H.W. Bush appointed Judge Boudin first to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia and then to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.
348. Gerald Ford appointed Judge Torruella to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico.
349. Ronald Reagan appointed Judge Torruella to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.
350. 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying rational basis test to
conclude that DOMA’s bar to treating same-sex couples as married for
estate tax purposes violated the taxpayers’ Fifth Amendment equal
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Windsor v. United States351
(on appeal at the Second
Circuit)

Dennis G. Jacobs352
Christopher F.
Droney
Chester J. Straub355

George H.W. Bush
William J. Clinton353
and Barack H. Obama354
William J. Clinton

Table 2: The judge and appointing president of lower court
decisions declaring DOMA unconstitutional before the Supreme
Court made that determination.

In addition to serving as exemplary models of judicial
independence by applying law to fact despite multiple external forces
denouncing extension of any rights—and especially marriage rights—
to gay men and lesbians, these federal court decisions striking down
DOMA could not have been predicted based upon the political views
of the presidents who appointed the jurists rendering the decisions.356
As illustrated in Table 2, the majority of judges ruling in favor of
marriage equality were appointed by Republican presidents. In an
interesting twist, the Second Circuit jurist who wrote the Windsor
opinion striking down DOMA was appointed by a Republican, while
the dissenting judge, who characterized DOMA as a legitimate
exercise of Congressional authority, was appointed by a Democrat.
As is true of the state court decisions explained previously, federal
court decisions declaring DOMA unconstitutional do not result from
improper “judicial activism” but rather exemplify judicial
independence. In each case, the judges meticulously applied Supreme
Court precedent to the largely undisputed facts presented. The First
Circuit’s consolidated resolution of Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management357 and Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
protection guarantees), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding
DOMA unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny standard).
351. 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding DOMA unconstitutional under
intermediate scrutiny standard), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
352. Judge Jacobs wrote the majority opinion for the panel.
353. Bill Clinton appointed Judge Droney to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut.
354. Barack Obama appointed Judge Droney to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
355. Judge Straub dissented. For more details of his dissent, see infra note
438. Thus, he cannot be counted among the judges that found DOMA
unconstitutional.
356. As explained previously, the political affiliation of a judge—indicated by
the appointing president—is a key component to the widely accepted
attitudinal model of judicial decision making, a model antithetical to
judicial independence. See discussion supra Part I.
357. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass 2010).
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Human Services358 typifies this judicial independence model of judicial
decision making.
In Gill, the district judge concluded that DOMA violates the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection rights of same-sex married
individuals.359 In Massachusetts, the same judge ruled that DOMA
runs afoul of both the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause
due to its effects on marriage-equality states.360 The First Circuit
reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment decisions de novo.361 At
the outset of the opinion, the First Circuit admitted the challenging
nature of its review:
This case is difficult because it couples issues of equal protection
and federalism with the need to assess the rationale for a
congressional statute passed with minimal hearings and lacking
in formal findings. In addition, Supreme Court precedent offers
some help to each side, but the rationale in several cases is open
to interpretation. We have done our best to discern the
direction of these precedents, but only the Supreme Court can
finally decide this unique case.362

Rather than shying away from the challenges posed by this politically
charged case, the First Circuit jurists worked methodically through
the arguments supporting and undermining DOMA’s constitutionality
and engaged in nuanced analyses of the applicable law and fact.
The court’s premier obstacle was determining the potential
preclusive effect of Baker v. Nelson.363 While acknowledging that the
358. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass 2010).
359. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 380–83, 396–97 (finding Fifth Amendment equal
protection violations in DOMA’s denial of health benefits associated
with federal employment, Social Security benefits based on spouse’s
earning record, spouse’s lump sum death benefits and widower’s income
benefits, and joint tax return filings under the Internal Revenue Code).
360. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 245–53 (finding DOMA: (1) an
illegitimate exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause authority because it
forced the state to treat same-sex and opposite-sex married couples
differently in situations including interment in federally-supported
veterans’ cemeteries, distribution of state-administered Medicaid
benefits, and Medicare taxes paid by the state for its employees without
providing a rational basis for doing so; and (2) contrary to the Tenth
Amendment’s state rights guarantees because it usurps states’
traditional power to regulate marriage).
361. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2012) (consolidating and affirming the judgments of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Gill and
Massachusetts).
362. Id. at 7–8.
363. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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Supreme Court’s recognition of “gay rights” in Romer and Lawrence
were grounded on the U.S. Constitution, the First Circuit refused to
declare Baker irrelevant.364 Because neither Romer nor Lawrence
involved marriage equality, the court concluded that “Baker does not
resolve our own case, but it does limit the arguments to ones that do
not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”365
Turning to the Gill plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment equal protection
claims, the court was immediately tasked with identifying the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. The court concluded that
plaintiffs could not successfully challenge DOMA under the
traditional rational basis test due to the great deference that standard
affords lawmakers.366 Noting the court’s duty to “accept as adequate
any plausible factual basis”367 justifying unequal treatment of samesex couples under the challenged statute, the court concluded that
“Congress could rationally have believed that DOMA would reduce
costs, even if newer studies of the actual economic effects of DOMA
suggest that it may in fact raise costs for the federal government.”368
The court displayed similar restraint in rejecting plaintiffs’
argument that the intermediate level of scrutiny should apply. Citing
First Circuit precedent resolving a constitutional challenge to the
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, the court reported that it
“has already declined to create a major new category of ‘suspect
classification’ for statutes distinguishing based on sexual
preference.”369 The court cited the Romer Court’s failure to adopt
such a classification.370 The First Circuit concluded that restraint was
required because “to create such a new suspect classification for samesex relationships would have far-reaching implications—in particular,
by implying an overruling of Baker, which we are neither empowered
to do nor willing to predict.”371
The First Circuit’s rejection of standard rational basis and
intermediate scrutiny to test DOMA’s constitutionality led the court
to a third option: a line of Supreme Court cases calling for application
of a variation on standard rational basis when the challenged
legislation disfavored unpopular groups. The First Circuit observed:

364. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 9.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.

926

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence
Without relying on suspect classifications, Supreme Court equal
protection decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported
justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant
treatment and have limited the permissible justifications.
And . . . in areas where state regulation has traditionally
governed, the Court may require that the federal government
interest in intervention be shown with special clarity.372

The First Circuit further explained that the Supreme Court
neither recognized a higher level of scrutiny nor applied traditional
rational basis in such cases.373 Instead, the Court closely examined
“the case-specific nature of the discrepant treatment, the burden
imposed, and the infirmities of the justifications offered.”374
Applying this analysis, the First Circuit found that the
“meaningful economic benefits” denied same-sex married couples
under DOMA similar to those withheld from unpopular groups by
legislation the Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional.375
Accordingly, “the extreme deference accorded to ordinary economic
legislation . . . would not be extended to DOMA by the Supreme
Court; and without insisting on ‘compelling’ or ‘important’
justifications or ‘narrow tailoring,’ the Court would scrutinize with
care the purported bases for the legislation.”376 Viewed through this
lens, plaintiffs’ argument regarding DOMA’s usurpation of states’
traditional role in defining marriage remained relevant to—but not
determinative of—DOMA’s constitutionality.377
The First Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ claims that DOMA
represented overreaching by Congress under the Spending Clause or
Tenth Amendment. The determination of marital status for federal
372. Id. at 10. The First Circuit also relied on U.S. Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), which found a federal law
that declared households with unrelated individuals ineligible for food
stamps to be unconstitutional, and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which invalidated a local ordinance as
applied to deny a home for persons with mental disabilities.
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10.
373. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 11.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 11–12. The First Circuit explained that “Supreme Court
precedent relating to federalism-based challenges to federal laws
reinforce the need for closer than usual scrutiny of DOMA’s justifications
and diminish somewhat the deference ordinarily accorded.” Id. The First
Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent from the nineteenth century
establishing that matters of domestic relations belong “to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.” Id. at 12 (citation
omitted) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890)).
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benefits programs presents a federal interest, the court reasoned, and
DOMA is not analogous to Supreme Court precedent declaring laws
unconstitutional because “Congress sought to commandeer state
governments or otherwise directly dictate the internal operations of
state government.”378 Although Congress was not dictating internal state
operations under DOMA, the court analogized to Supreme Court
decisions invoking Commerce Clause and other constitutional
authorities to conclude that “Congress’ effort to put a thumb on the
scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own
marriage laws does bear on how the justifications are assessed.”379
Having found that “a closer examination of the justifications that
would prevent DOMA from violating equal protection (and thus from
exceeding federal authority) is uniquely reinforced by federalism
concerns,”380 the First Circuit carefully reviewed the four justifications
for DOMA found in the House Committee Report381 and two related
arguments advanced by BLAG. The Report’s justifications mirrored
those raised in the state constitutional challenges discussed
previously: “(1) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional,
heterosexual marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of morality;
(3) protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance; and
(4) preserving scarce government resources.”382 BLAG’s additional
justifications for DOMA were the “support [of] child-rearing in the
context of a stable marriage”383 and Congress’s intent to “freeze” the
debate over same-sex marriage to provide time to “reflect.”384 The
First Circuit found these rationales insufficient to justify DOMA’s
disparate treatment of same-sex couples.
The First Circuit rejected the defense of traditional marriage
rationale because “DOMA does not increase benefits to opposite-sex
couples—whose marriages may in any event be childless, unstable or
both—or explain how denying benefits to same-sex couples will
reinforce heterosexual marriage.”385 The court characterized this
378. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12.
379. Id. at 12–13.
380. Id. at 13.
381. The First Circuit also found it curious that Congress would enact any
statute with such tremendous ramifications for federal and state law
after a single day of hearings during which “none of the testimony
concerned DOMA’s effects on the numerous federal programs at issue,”
and that the entire statute is only a few paragraphs long with no preface
to explain its purpose. Id at 13.
382. H.R. Rep No. 104-664, at 12 (1996).
383. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 14.
384. Id. at 15–16.
385. Id. at 14.
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rationale not merely as a “poor fit” that might otherwise suffice under
rational basis analysis, but as evincing “a lack of any demonstrated
connection between DOMA’s treatment of same-sex couples and its
asserted goal of strengthening the bonds and benefits to society of
heterosexual marriage.”386
While acknowledging that “[m]oral judgments can hardly be
avoided in legislation,”387 the court found “traditional notions of
morality” insufficient to justify DOMA’s treatment of gay and lesbian
couples because “Lawrence ruled that moral disapproval alone cannot
justify legislation discriminating on this basis.”388
The court recognized that DOMA’s usurping of the states’ power
to regulate marriage “indeed is antithetical to” the goals of protecting
state sovereignty and self-governance.389 The First Circuit readily
conceded that members of Congress may have legitimately believed
that DOMA would help preserve government resources, but observed
that “where the distinction is drawn against a historically
disadvantaged group and has no other basis, Supreme Court
precedent marks this [economic argument] as a reason undermining
rather than bolstering the distinction.”390
The First Circuit found the government’s support-for-childrearing rationale similarly unpersuasive because “DOMA cannot
preclude same-sex couples . . . from adopting children or prevent a
woman partner from giving birth to a child to be raised by both
partners.”391 Finally, the First Circuit deemed the “time to reflect”
argument insufficient to justify DOMA because the statute contained
no sunset provision and because “[t]he House Report’s own
arguments—moral, prudential and fiscal—make clear that DOMA
was not framed as a temporary measure.”392
In wrangling with this challenging case, the First Circuit noted
the federal judiciary’s disfavor for declaring legislation
unconstitutional.393 The court acknowledged that its review of DOMA

386. Id. at 15.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 14–15 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003)).
389. Id. at 14. The court noted that this rationale for DOMA supported
section 2 of the act, which empowers states to disregard marriages of
same-sex couples from other states, but that section was not at issue in
this case. Id.
390. Id. at 14.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 15.
393. Id. The Court stated that “[i]nvalidating a federal statute is an
unwelcome responsibility for federal judges.” Id.
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started with the presumption that Congress had acted in good faith.394
“In reaching our judgment,” the court explained, “we do not rely
upon the charge that DOMA’s hidden but dominant purpose was
hostility to homosexuality.”395 To the contrary, the court hypothesized
that many members of Congress supported DOMA to “preserve the
heritage of marriage as traditionally defined over centuries of Western
civilization,” a motivation distinct from “mere moral disapproval of an
unpopular group” as condemned by Lawrence.396 Even so, application
of the court’s “best understanding of governing precedent”397 to the
facts required it to strike down the statute. The First Circuit
concluded:
For 150 years, this desire to maintain tradition would
alone have been justification enough for almost any statute.
This judicial deference has a distinguished lineage, including
such figures as Justice Holmes, the second Justice Harlan, and
Judges Learned Hand and Henry Friendly. But Supreme Court
decisions in the last fifty years call for closer scrutiny of
government action touching upon minority group interests and
of federal action in areas of traditional state concern.
....
. . . Under current Supreme Court authority, Congress’ denial of
federal benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in
Massachusetts has not been adequately supported by any
permissible federal interest.398

This explanation of the First Circuit’s resolution of Gill and
Massachusetts does not mean that this court’s analysis represents the
only legitimate manner in which an independent judiciary could
declare DOMA unconstitutional. To the contrary, other courts that
subjected DOMA to higher standards of scrutiny similarly engaged in
painstaking application of law to fact. But the First Circuit’s acute
deference to circuit and Supreme Court precedent, its refusal to break
new paths in constitutional law, its careful application of law to the
uncontested facts, its predisposition to upholding legislation, and its
assumption of Congress’s good faith in enacting DOMA document
that a court employing a conservative approach to constitutional
analysis can—and should—find compelling grounds supporting
394. Id.
395. Id. at 16.
396. Id. at 16 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
397. Id. at 15–16.
398. Id. at 16.
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marriage equality in the U.S. Constitution. In short, the First
Circuit’s resolution of the constitutional issues in Gill and
Massachusetts cannot be characterized as the work of an
inappropriately “activist” court. For the reasons set forth below, the
same conclusions can be drawn for the trial and circuit court decisions
in Windsor, although the Supreme Court’s opinion gives pause.
C.
1.

Windsor
District Court

Plaintiff Edith (“Edie”) Windsor and her spouse, Thea Spyer,
were in a committed relationship for more than four-and-a-half
decades.399 They registered as domestic partners in New York City
when that option became available in 1993 and married in Canada in
2007.400 Spyer died in 2009, and her estate passed to Windsor.401 New
York recognized the Windsor–Spyer marriage, but DOMA precluded
the federal government from doing so.402 Because of DOMA, Windsor
failed to qualify for the unlimited marital deduction under 26 U.S.C.
§ 2056(a) and paid $363,053 in federal estate taxes.403
Windsor initiated a refund suit alleging that DOMA’s bar to her
marital deduction claim violated her Fifth Amendment equal
protection rights.404 She urged the court to apply strict scrutiny to
DOMA, a test requiring the government to prove that DOMA is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling or legitimate government
interest. Windsor alternatively argued that DOMA is unconstitutional
even under the highly deferential rational basis test.405 The House of
Representatives’ Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”)
intervened to defend DOMA after Attorney General Holder
announced that the Department of Justice would no longer do so.406
After rejecting BLAG’s arguments that Windsor lacked
standing407 and that Baker precluded her lawsuit,408 the district court
399. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. The district court rejected BLAG’s argument that New York State did
not recognize Windsor’s Canadian marriage at the time Spyer died in
2009 in light of significant evidence that New York recognized such
marriages as early as 2004 and that the governor issued a directive in
2008 requiring recognition. Id. at 398–99.
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rejected Windsor’s argument that DOMA should be reviewed under
strict or intermediate scrutiny.409 The court observed that eleven other
circuit courts had used rational basis when the challenged legislative
classification was based on sexual orientation and that the Supreme
Court had declined to adopt a higher level of scrutiny despite the
opportunity presented by Romer.410 “In any event,” the court
explained, “the constitutional question presented here may be
disposed of under a rational basis review,” thereby negating the need
to “decide today whether homosexuals are a suspect class.”411
Based on the Supreme Court’s intensified rational basis review in
Lawrence, Romer, and other cases involving legislation that targeted
historically disfavored groups, and in light of DOMA’s intrusion into
matters traditionally governed by state law, the Windsor trial court
reviewed DOMA under the enhanced rational basis test the First
Circuit employed in Gill and Massachusetts.412 Similar to the First
Circuit’s analysis, the Windsor trial court’s careful examination of
DOMA’s justifications articulated in the House Report and by BLAG
yielded no sufficient grounds justifying the federal government’s
nonrecognition of Windsor’s marriage to Spyer.413 On June 6, 2012,
the trial court granted Windsor’s motion for summary judgment and
ordered the federal government to refund her estate tax payment.414
2.

Second Circuit

The Second Circuit’s de novo review affirmed Windsor’s victory
in a 2–1 decision.415
The majority affirmed the district court’s rulings that Windsor
had standing416 and that Baker did not preclude federal courts from
408. The district court relied on Supreme Court precedent limiting the
preclusive effect of its summary affirmances “to the precise legal
questions and facts presented in the jurisdictional statement.” Id. at 399
(citations omitted). The court further explained that: (1) DOMA, unlike
the Minnesota statute challenged in Baker, does not prohibit same-sex
marriage; and (2) unlike the Baker plaintiffs, Windsor does not argue
that marriage is a fundamental right. Id. Thus Baker had not
“necessarily decided” Windsor’s Fifth Amendment equal protection
challenge. Id.
409. Id. at 401–02.
410. Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
411. Id. at 402. The court also noted that this conclusion honored the wellsettled principle of avoiding constitutional issues superfluous to the
result. Id. at 402 n.2.
412. Id. at 402.
413. Id. at 402–06.
414. Id. at 406.
415. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).

932

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence

addressing Windsor’s Fifth Amendment equal protection claims.417
Unlike the district court below and the First Circuit’s recent
resolution of Gill and Massachusetts, the Second Circuit in Windsor
rejected application of enhanced rational basis review, finding that the
origin of that standard in concurring and dissenting Supreme Court
opinions attests to “some doctrinal instability in this area.”418 In any
event, the Second Circuit explained that “no permutation of rational
basis review is needed if heightened scrutiny is available, as it is in
this case.”419
Based on extensive guidance from numerous Supreme Court
opinions, the Second Circuit identified these factors as determinative
of heightened scrutiny’s applicability to Windsor’s equal protection
arguments:
A) whether the class has been historically “subjected to
discrimination,” B) whether the class has a defining
characteristic that “frequently bears [a] relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society,” C) whether the class exhibits
“obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that

416. The Second Circuit declined BLAG’s request to certify to New York’s
highest court the issue of whether New York recognized Windsor’s 2007
Canadian marriage to Spyer at the time of Spyer’s death in 2009, even
though New York did not allow same-sex couples to marry in that state
until 2011. Id. at 177–78. Because the Second Circuit found the
decisions of New York’s intermediate appellate courts “useful and
unanimous on this issue,” the court found “no need to seek guidance
here.” Id. at 177–78.
417. The court distinguished the constitutional issue in Baker of whether
states could restrict marriage to opposite sex couples from Windsor’s
challenge to the federal government’s power to do so, and also noted
significant changes in Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence since
Baker, including recognition of intermediate scrutiny and cases like
Romer and Lawrence legitimizing federal constitutional claims by gay
and lesbian litigants. Id. at 178–79; see also id. at 178 n.1 (collecting
cases with same conclusion).
418. Id. at 181.
419. Id. Similar conclusions were reached in Pedersen v. Office of Personnel
Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012) (finding strict
scrutiny appropriate but determining inequality resulting from DOMA
could not survive even rational basis standard), Golinski v. U.S. Office
of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(finding DOMA unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny or rational
basis), Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to state statute denying marriage to gay and
lesbian couples), and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957
A.2d 407, 412, 480 (Conn. 2008) (applying intermediate scrutiny in state
constitutional law challenge to statute’s denial of marriage based on
sexual orientation).
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define them as a discrete group[,]” and D) whether the class is
“a minority or politically powerless.”420

The court further clarified that immutability and political
powerlessness are relevant but “not strictly necessary factors to
identify a suspect class.”421 The Second Circuit encountered little
difficulty in finding all these factors present in Windsor.
BLAG’s concession that homosexuals have been subjected to
discrimination in the United States since at least the 1920s led the
court to conclude that “[n]inety years of discrimination is entirely
sufficient to document a ‘history of discrimination.’”422
Classification based on sexual orientation is not grounded in an
“ability to perform or contribute,” the court determined, because
“[t]he aversion homosexuals experience has nothing to do with
aptitude or performance.”423
The requirement that the class members exhibit “obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” cannot be limited to
immutability, the court reasoned, because “[c]lassifications based on
alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are all subject to heightened
scrutiny, . . . even though these characteristics do not declare
themselves, and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of
preference.”424 Rather, the determinative factor “is whether the
characteristic of the class calls down discrimination when it is
manifest.”425 The court also rejected BLAG’s argument that sexual
orientation is too amorphous to constitute a discrete class because the
class affected by DOMA “is composed entirely of persons of the same
sex who have married each other . . . [and] as counsel for BLAG
conceded at argument, there is nothing amorphous, capricious, or
tentative about their sexual orientation.”426

420. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181 (citations omitted).
421. Id.
422. Id. at 182.
423. Id. at 182–83. The court also rejected BLAG’s argument “that same-sex
couples have a diminished ability to discharge family roles in
procreation and the raising of children” for lack of precedent, further
explaining that “the abilities or inabilities cited by BLAG bear upon
whether the law withstands scrutiny (the second step of analysis) rather
than upon the level of scrutiny to apply.” Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
424. Id. (citation and footnote omitted). The court further observed that
even though protected by the Supreme Court under intermediate
scrutiny, classes defined by “[a]lienage and illegitimacy are actually
subject to change.” Id. at 183 n.4.
425. Id. at 183.
426. Id. at 184.
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In addressing the final factor, the court explained that the key
issue “is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes
over the years” but rather “whether they have the strength to
politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimination.”427
Comparing the contemporary political status of homosexuals with the
political status of women in 1973 when the Supreme Court declared
intermediate scrutiny appropriate for gender-based classifications,428
the Second Circuit concluded that gay men and lesbians are still
unable “to adequately protect themselves from the discriminatory
wishes of the majoritarian public.”429
This multifactor analysis led the Second Circuit to select
intermediate scrutiny as its gauge for assessing DOMA’s
constitutionality.430 Accordingly, BLAG bore the burden of
demonstrating how DOMA’s sexual orientation classifications are
“substantially related to an important government interest.”431 The
Second Circuit emphasized that the justifications must be both
“exceedingly persuasive”432 and “genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”433 BLAG’s arguments that
DOMA furthered the important governmental interests of providing a
uniform definition of marriage,434 protecting financial resources,435
avoiding the “unknown consequences” of redefining “a foundational
social institution,”436 and encouraging “responsible procreation”437 did
not satisfy the Second Circuit.438
427. Id.
428. Id. at 184–85.
429. Id. at 185.
430. Id.
431. Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
432. Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))
(citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
433. Id.
434. Id. at 185–86. The Second Circuit found the consistency argument
unpersuasive because DOMA represented an unprecedented intrusion by
the federal government into an area of law uniquely reserved to the
states and because DOMA “left standing all other inconsistencies in the
laws of the states, such as minimum age, consanguinity, divorce, and
paternity.” Id. at 186.
435. Id. at 186–87. While recognizing that financial management is an
important government interest, the Second Circuit recognized that cost
savings alone cannot justify discrimination and also observed that
DOMA affects the application of more than 1,000 laws, many of which
have nothing to do with government revenues. Id.
436. Id. at 185. The Second Circuit noted that tradition alone was not
deemed sufficient to uphold sodomy laws or bans on interracial
marriage, adding that DOMA is a poor means to preserve traditional
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In declaring DOMA unconstitutional, the Second Circuit resisted
pressure from religious groups to uphold the law. The court
concluded:
Our straightforward legal analysis sidesteps the fair point
that same-sex marriage is unknown to history and tradition.
But law (federal or state) is not concerned with holy
matrimony. Government deals with marriage as a civil status—
however fundamental—and New York has elected to extend
that status to same-sex couples. A state may enforce and
dissolve a couple’s marriage, but it cannot sanctify or bless it.
For that, the pair must go next door.439

The Second Circuit’s embrace of intermediate scrutiny to analyze
sexual orientation discrimination is well supported by application of
extant law defining that standard to the facts repeatedly established
in Windsor and other marriage equality cases. Nonetheless, it is more
challenging to characterize a case as an appropriate exercise of
judicial authority when it takes a view distinct from the eleven other
circuit courts that have addressed it. But novelty alone does not move
the decision from an appropriate exercise of judicial independence to
inappropriate activism. To the contrary, cases in which the courts
have refused to act boldly have proven the most damaging to the
credibility of constitutional jurisprudence by allowing the tyranny of
the majority to trump the constitutional rights of unpopular
minorities.440 In any event, the Second Circuit’s split with its sister
marriage because states retain the power to allow same-sex couples to
marry. Id. at 187.
437. Id. at 187. The Second Circuit accepted BLAG’s characterization of
promoting procreation as an important governmental interest but could
not find even a rational connection between DOMA and that interest
because DOMA created no additional incentives for opposite-sex couples
to marry and raise children. Id.
438. The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority on virtually every
point, concluding that Baker barred Windsor’s arguments, that the
standard rational basis test should be applied to determine DOMA’s
constitutionality, and that numerous arguments advanced by BLAG
satisfy that standard. Id. at 188–211 (Straub, J., dissenting). The
dissent also expressed a strong preference for the American people,
rather than the judiciary, to decide the issue of marriage by same-sex
couples. Id. at 211.
439. Id. at 188 (majority opinion).
440. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
federal government’s exclusion order requiring relocation from the West
Coast and internment of Japanese Americans during World War II
despite strict scrutiny analysis required for race-based classifications);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting equal protection and
other Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state law providing “equal
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circuits provided an additional compelling reason for Supreme Court
review.
3.

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court’s decision to hear Windsor raised the hopes
and fears of advocates and opponents of marriage equality.441 In
addition to resolving DOMA’s constitutionality, many observers
anticipated that the Supreme Court would finally determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny for equal protection challenges based on
sexual orientation classifications. The Court’s 5–4 decision striking
down DOMA represents a landmark victory for advocates of the
rights of gay men and lesbians, but it did not clarify the appropriate
standard of review.442
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy immediately
confronted two potentially dispositive issues: “whether the United
States’ agreement with [the district court’s] legal position precludes
further review [of DOMA’s constitutionality] and whether BLAG has
standing to appeal the case.”443 The Court had instructed the parties
to address these issues in its order granting certiorari444 and
subsequently invited Harvard Law Professor Vicki Jackson to submit
an amicus brief arguing against jurisdiction on both issues,445 which
she did.446
but separate accommodations for the white and colored races” on
railroads, and holding race-based separation an appropriate exercise of
states’ police powers when regulating public transportation, schools, and
other areas of public accommodation).
441. These hopes were reinforced by the Court’s acceptance of Hollingsworth
v. Perry, a Fourteenth Amendment and fundamental right challenge to
California’s state constitutional marriage ban. The trial court struck
down the ban. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, although on grounds only applicable
to California’s unique situation of having allowed same-sex marriages
and then banning them. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
The Supreme Court decided Perry on the same day as Windsor,
concluding that appellants lacked standing in their appeals to the Ninth
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013). Accordingly, the district court decision stands. Although its
precedential value is limited, the district court litigation serves as a
model for challenges to other states’ bans being litigated in federal
courts. A more complete analysis of Perry is outside the scope of this
article.
442. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
443. Id. at 2684.
444. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
445. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 814 (2012).
446. Brief for Vicki C. Jackson as Court-Appointed Amica Curiae
Addressing Jurisdiction, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
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Although the government aligned with Windsor’s legal position,
the President’s directive to the Executive Branch to continue
enforcing DOMA resulted in the government’s continued refusal to
refund Windsor’s tax payment.447 The Court concluded that the
government’s rebuff created a justiciable controversy between
Windsor and the government.448 The Court further reasoned that the
federal government did not achieve the same “prevailing party” status
as Windsor due to the trial court’s ruling—albeit a ruling the
government desired—that DOMA is unconstitutional.449 The Court
upheld the government’s standing to appeal the trial court decision by
emphasizing the distinction between two bedrock principles: “the
jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on
its exercise.”450
As to the Article III case and controversy requirement, the Court
identified the federal government’s injury-in-fact in the trial court’s
order “to pay money that it would not disburse but for the court’s
order.”451 As to prudential standing, the Court recognized that the
government’s alignment with Windsor’s legal position raised concerns
that the appeal might lack the “concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”452 The Court found
the potential jurisdictional bar overcome in this case due to “the
Executive’s unusual position”453 and several other factors.
First, the participation of BLAG and amici curiae assured that
DOMA would be vigorously defended.454 Second, the Court considered
(2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 443. Professor
Jackson is the Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law at
Harvard.
447. Holder letter, supra note 337 (“Notwithstanding this determination, the
President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be enforced
by the Executive Branch. To that end, the President has instructed
Executive agencies to continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA,
consistent with the Executive's obligation to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the
judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law's
constitutionality. This course of action respects the actions of the prior
Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the
final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”).
448. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 2686.
452. Id. at 2687 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
453. Id.
454. Id.
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the consequences of jurisdictional dismissal relevant to its exercise of
prudential standing. “The district courts in 94 districts throughout
the Nation would be without precedential guidance,” the Court wrote,
“in cases involving the whole of DOMA’s sweep involving over 1,000
federal statutes and a myriad of federal regulations.”455 The Court also
observed that it could take years for a similar case to work its way
through the courts, meaning that “the costs, uncertainties, and
alleged harm and injuries likely would continue for a time measured
in years before the issue is resolved.”456
Turning to the merits, the Court recognized Congress’s power to
regulate marriage for discrete federal purposes.457 It also recognized
that the definition and regulation of marriage have historically “been
treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate
States.”458 As a result, “the Federal Government, through our history,
has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic
relations.”459 Marriage laws governing the age of consent and
consanguinity may (and do) vary among the states,460 the Court
observed, but no state marriage requirement may run afoul of the
U.S. Constitution.461
Turning to Congress’s most extensive legislation governing
marriage, the Court found serious constitutional flaws in Congress’s
motivations for passing DOMA and the statute’s excessively broad
impact on the rights, privileges, and obligations of same-sex married
couples and their children. Congress’s “interference with the equal
dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the
exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect
of the federal statute,” the Court wrote.462 “It was its essence.”463 The
Court cited the House Report’s multiple references to moral
condemnation of homosexuality as evidence of Congress’s animus
toward gay men and lesbians.464 DOMA’s control “over 1,000 statutes
455. Id. at 2688.
456. Id. The Court’s holding that the government had properly pursued its
appeal negated the need to determine whether BLAG had standing to
do so. Id.
457. Id. at 2690 (“Yet it is further established that Congress, in enacting
discrete statutes, can make determinations that bear on marital rights
and privileges.”).
458. Id.
459. Id. at 2691.
460. Id. at 2691–92.
461. Id. at 2691 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
462. Id. at 2693.
463. Id.
464. Id.
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and numerous federal regulations . . . pertaining to Social Security,
housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits”
and other areas of the law,465 the Court opined, “writes inequality into
the entire United States Code.”466 The Court concluded:
[T]he principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are
to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.
This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws . . . .
While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all
the better understood and preserved.467

DOMA is invalid, the Court reiterated, because “no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”468
To no one’s surprise, the four dissenting justices took the majority
to task at every turn.
Chief Justice Roberts found no evidence that a “bare desire to
harm” motivated Congress’s passage of DOMA469 and predicted that
the majority’s reliance on federalism “will come into play on the other
side of the board in future cases about the constitutionality of state
marriage definitions.”470
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas, accused
the majority of possessing an “exalted conception” of the Court’s role
in deciding constitutional issues.471 He opined that the parties’
standing to appeal evaporated when “Windsor’s injury was cured by

465. Id. at 2694.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 2695.
468. Id. at 2696.
469. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
470. Id. at 2697.
471. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the judgment in her favor”472 and the federal government concurred in
the district court’s decision.473
Turning to the majority’s decision on the merits, Justice Scalia
found the Court’s justifications “rootless and shifting”474 for initially
appearing to be grounded in federalism and then turning to Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment principles.475 Justice Scalia reprimanded the
majority for failing to address the “central question” of “whether,
under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man
and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality.”476
Although characterizing DOMA as violating Fifth Amendment
liberty guarantees, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he majority never
utters the dread words ‘substantive due process,’ perhaps sensing the
disrepute into which that doctrine has fallen, but that is what those
statements mean.”477 Justice Alito’s dissent similarly challenged the
majority’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment. Substantive due process
only applies to fundamental rights deeply rooted in history and
tradition, Justice Alito writes, while marriage equality was not
recognized by any state until the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
Goodridge decision in 2003.478 Because “the Constitution simply does
not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage,”479 and because the
effects of same-sex marriage are unknown and potentially far
reaching,480 Justice Alito opined that “[a]ny change on a question so
fundamental should be made by the people through their elected
officials” rather than by the courts.481
Justice Scalia also characterized the majority’s opinion as a thinly
disguised attempt to set the stage for reaching “the same conclusion

472. Id. at 2699.
473. Id. at 2700. In his separate dissent, Justice Alito agreed with Justice
Scalia that the federal government lacked standing to appeal. Id. at
2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, however, opined that
BLAG’s intervention at the trial level and continued involvement in the
case satisfied the standing requirements at both the circuit court and
the Supreme Court. Id. at 2712–14. Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice
Alito’s standing analysis and conclusion. Id. at 2703–05 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
474. Id. at 2705.
475. Id. at 2706.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
479. Id. at 2716.
480. Id. at 2715–16.
481. Id. at 2716.
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with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status.”482
After identifying several passages from the majority’s Fifth
Amendment analysis that Justice Scalia views as “deliberately
transposable” to future Fourteenth Amendment marriage equality
cases challenging state marriage bans,483 Justice Scalia predicted that
“[a]s far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just
a matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe.”484
The dissenting justices’ sharp critiques of the majority’s opinion
undermine the possibility that Windsor will be commonly cited as
exemplary of judicial independence.485 At times the majority opinion
tends to meander, thus lending support to the characterization of the
decision as a result in search of a rationale. As Justice Scalia observes,
the opinion appears initially to be grounding itself in well-established
federalism principles before making a rather abrupt turn to Fifth
Amendment liberty interests. And while marriage equality litigants
have long argued that marriage is a fundamental right to which samesex couples are entitled, the Court sidesteps this long-standing and
potentially dispositive issue by grounding its holding in a more
amorphous Fifth Amendment liberty interest.
The validity of the Windsor Court’s reliance on Fifth Amendment
due process will be scrutinized in exceedingly fine detail by multitudes
of constitutional scholars for decades to come. As proven by Loving v.
Virginia,486 Brown v. Board of Education,487 and other opinions the
Court has issued on highly charged sociopolitical issues, the legitimacy
of the Windsor decision will be finally determined through a historical
rather than contemporary lens.
Analyzing the degree of judicial independence exercised by the
Windsor majority requires identification of the decision-making model
employed in this case. The Windsor Court’s failure to either: (1)
employ standard equal protection analysis488 to resolve Windsor’s
claim, or (2) articulate a reason for rejecting that analysis provides
important clues in this endeavor.
482. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
483. Id. at 2709–10.
484. Id. at 2710.
485. A more comprehensive evaluation of Windsor’s standing analysis
requires a detailed comparison to the Court’s opposite conclusion in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), which, as previously
noted, is outside the scope of this article.
486. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
487. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
488. In this context, “standard equal protection grounds” means the Court’s
application of the appropriate level of scrutiny (rational basis, enhanced
rational basis, intermediate, or strict) to the justifications proffered by
the government for the challenged law.
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These omissions are especially curious due to myriad factors
supporting application of a standard equal protection analysis to
Windsor’s claim. The plaintiff’s complaint challenged DOMA on equal
protection grounds. The Second Circuit decision under review not
only relied on an equal protection analysis, but also broke ranks with
other circuits489—and the Court’s Romer decision—by declaring
intermediate scrutiny applicable to legislative classifications based on
sexual orientation. Windsor’s affirmance of the Second Circuit
decision, albeit on other grounds, arguably leaves intermediate
scrutiny intact in non-marriage sexual orientation equality claims
brought in the Second Circuit.
In addition, the primary question debated by the parties and
many amici who submitted briefs to the Supreme Court was the
proper level of scrutiny to be applied to Windsor’s equal protection
analysis.490 And the Court clearly recognized DOMA’s creation of two
distinct classes: opposite-sex couples whose marriages were honored
by the federal government and same-sex couples whose marriages
were not.491 What then can explain the Court’s failure to apply—and,
if necessary, to clarify—extant equal protection principles instead of
charting a new course through Fifth Amendment jurisprudence?
In short, Windsor is a very curious opinion both for what it does
and does not hold.
Only the justices who constitute the Windsor majority truly know
what informed their individual and collective decisions to rely on
Fifth Amendment substantive due process informed by equal
protection and federalism principles rather than classic equal
protection or fundamental right (to marry) analyses. Constitutional
law is exceedingly complex, and, despite the continuing protests of
Justice Scalia and other conservatives, it is of necessity an evolving
body of law. Prior to Windsor, the Court had firmly established that
the Fifth Amendment liberty interest “extends to the full range of
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be

489. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(applying the rational basis test), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012)
(applying the intermediate scrutiny standard).
490. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(commenting that “[t]he opinion does not resolve and indeed does not
even mention what had been the central question in this litigation:
whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage
to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality”).
491. Id. at 2694 (majority opinion) (criticizing DOMA for “creating two
contradictory marriage regimes” that place “same-sex couples in an
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage”).
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restricted except for a proper governmental objective.”492 Each justice
may firmly believe that the Fifth Amendment analysis they employed
to strike down DOMA represents no more than a nuanced application
of well-established law to fact, an exercise well within the bounds of
judicial independence.
Another plausible explanation is that pragmatic considerations
influenced the justices’ resolution of Windsor’s appeal. The Windsor
Court strayed outside the realm of true judicial independence if the
justices’ pragmatic concerns about the impact of its decision493
motivated the justices’ rejection of equal protection or fundamental
right analyses in favor of Fifth Amendment substantive due process.
Evidence that Windsor reflects pragmatic judicial decision
making494 is first found in the Court’s analysis of the jurisdictional
issue created by the government’s alignment with the plaintiff at the
trial level. In concluding that both Article III and prudential standing
are satisfied, the Court emphasized the consequences of this appeal’s
dismissal. The Court explained:
The district courts in 94 districts throughout the Nation would
be without precedential guidance . . . in cases involving the
whole of DOMA’s sweep involving over 1,000 federal statutes
and a myriad of federal regulations . . . . Rights and privileges
of hundreds of thousands of persons would be adversely affected.
...
. . . [A]t some point a case likely would arise without the
prudential concerns raised here; but the costs, uncertainties, and
alleged harm and injuries likely would continue for a time
measured in years before the issue is resolved. In these unusual
and urgent circumstances, the very term “prudential” counsels
that it is a proper exercise of the Court’s responsibility to take
jurisdiction. For these reasons, the prudential and Article III
requirements are met here.495

Attaching a pragmatic label to the majority’s decision making in
Windsor is further bolstered by considering the huge impact of the
492. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (finding the District of
Columbia’s racially segregated school system contrary to Fifth
Amendment’s liberty guarantee).
493. For the argument that pragmatic concerns influence every judicial
decision, including Windsor, see Scherer, supra note 57.
494. More precisely, the judicial decision-making model employed by the
Windsor Court is most likely restrained pragmatism, as the Court’s
decision reflects both concern for the parties before it and the impact of
the decision. See discussion supra Part II.A.
495. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
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decision on states if DOMA had been declared unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds. Regardless of whether the Court had
employed Romer’s enhanced rational basis test used by most federal
courts or the intermediate scrutiny employed by the Second Circuit,
the Court’s Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis striking down
DOMA likely would be imported immediately to Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to state constitutional and statutory
prohibitions of marriage by same-sex couples.
Immediate application of Windsor to Fourteenth Amendment
cases would be justified under the indissoluble link between Fifth and
Fourteen Amendment jurisprudence. This link was created and
endures because the Fifth Amendment contains no explicit guarantee
of “equal protection.” Rather, six decades ago the Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates sub
silento an equal protection component.496 This reverse incorporation of
Fourteen Amendment equal protection into Fifth Amendment due
process eternally joins Court opinions interpreting the two.
Hence, if the Windsor Court had engaged in an equal protection
analysis to strike down a federal marriage law under the Fifth
Amendment, lower federal courts would employ the same analysis to
resolve pending and future Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenges to state marriage laws. And, because states defend their
respective marriage bans on the same grounds advanced by BLAG in
Windsor such as tradition, morality, child rearing, and conservation of
resources, a Windsor rejection of such justifications would likely doom
the states’ defenses as well. In other words, a Windsor decision
invalidating DOMA on equal protection grounds simultaneously
would have sounded the death knell for state constitutional and
statutory bans on marriage by same-sex couples even though the
challenge to state bans was not before the Court.497
496. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (finding the District of Columbia’s racially
segregated schools created under federal charter unconstitutional on
Fifth Amendment grounds for the same reasons that segregated schools
created under state charters failed equal protection analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment in the companion case of Brown v. Board of
Education); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695 (citing to Bolling
twice in the majority opinion, but not to invoke classic equal protection
analysis of DOMA); Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 Colum. L.
Rev. 975, 975, 982–90 (2004) (explaining Bolling and “the absence of
successful race discrimination claims against the federal government”).
497. As Justice Scalia predicted, Windsor may have this impact on state law
despite the majority’s reliance on substantive due process rather than
equal protection grounds. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Another possibility is that courts will interpret the Court’s
substantive due process holding as equivalent to its recognition of a
fundamental right to marry, again providing grounds for invalidating
state constitutional and statutory bans. See Douglas NeJaime,
Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 Yale L.J. Online 219 (2013).
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Of course, the Court is no stranger to invaliding state laws.
Lawrence struck down not only the Texas sodomy law at issue but
also simultaneously invalidated similar laws in twelve other states.498
The Loving Court doomed bans on interracial marriage in Virginia
and fifteen other states.499 But a Supreme Court decision requiring
states to recognize same-sex marriages would have invalidated thirtytwo state statutes500 and twenty-nine state constitutional
amendments,501 many of which were enacted with overwhelming voter
support.502 The Windsor majority may have perceived such a bold
move as a bridge too far. Thus, pragmatism may have inspired the
Windsor Court’s restraint, even if the five justices in the majority
believe that not only DOMA but also state constitutional bans violate
federal constitutional guarantees.

Conclusion
Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor described
the Court’s 1954 earthshaking school desegregation decision in Brown

498. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (observing that “[t]he 25
States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the
Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws
only against homosexual conduct”).
499. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (stating that “Virginia is now
one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of
racial classifications”).
500. The majority of statutory same-sex marriage bans were passed around
the same time as DOMA’s 1996 enactment. See Marriage &
Relationship Recognition Laws, Movement Advance Project,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/marriage_relationship_laws
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (providing information on the history and
status of each state’s laws on marriage equality); see also Gay Marriage,
ProCon.org,
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=004857 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Gay
Marriage].
501. Gay Marriage, supra note 500 (providing the date of each state’s
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage).
502. The largest movement toward marriage inequality was the eighty-six
percent approval by Mississippi voters in 2004, and the smallest margin
was the four percent of voters who carried California’s 2008 ban. The
national average was sixty-seven percent voter approval for same-sex
marriage bans prior to the most recent exercise in direct democracy: the
May 2012 North Carolina ban approved by sixty-one percent of voters.
See History of State Constitutional Marriage Bans: How North
Carolina’s Amendment 1 Fits in the Larger Picture, Human Rights
Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/state-constitutional-ma
rriage-bans (last visited Jan. 31, 2014); see also Gay Marriage, supra
note 500.
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v. Board of Education503 as “an exercise of accountability to the Rule
of Law over the popular will.”504 As explained throughout this article,
state and federal court decisions extending marriage equality,
relationship recognition, and other rights and privileges to lesbian and
gay individuals and couples should similarly be characterized as
appropriate exercises of judicial independence, not inappropriate
judicial activism. Simply put, many judges have rejected reliance on
their own biases and preconceived notions about LGBT litigants in
favor of applying the law to the credible and often undisputed
evidence before them. Windsor’s apparent embrace of the pragmatic
judicial decision-making model to rectify marriage inequality at the
federal level while leaving inequity firmly ensconced in the vast
majority of states serves as an important reminder, however, that the
degree of judicial independence necessary to achieve full LGBT
equality has yet to be realized.505

503. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
504. Sandra Day O’Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not
Threaten, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 86 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 1, 3 (2008).
505. Updates on the multitude of marriage equality cases currently pending
in state and federal courts are available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/
pending-marriage-equality-cases.
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